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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data from a large enterprise-level panel designed to address this issue, we account for 
enterprise performance in Russia. We link performance to four aspects of the economic 
environment: enterprise ownership; corporate governance; market structures and competition; 
and financial constraints. We conclude that private ownership and improved performance are not 
correlated, though restructuring is positively associated with the competitiveness of the market 
environment. These findings on private ownership support those of previous studies, e.g. Earle 
and Estrin (1997). Moreover, we find evidence that financially unconstrained firms are better in 
their undertaking of restructuring measures then financially constrained firms. Further analysis 
suggests that causality runs from restructuring to financial constraint, rather than the reverse. 
Finally, our findings indicate strong complementarities between the four factors influencing 
improved company performance, confirming the view that these factors need to be considered 
jointly. 
 
JEL classification: D21, L10, P31, G34 
Keywords: Privatisation, enterprise performance, competition, corporate governance, investment 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
More than a decade into the transition period, Russia’s economic performance has been 
disappointing. Compared to leading countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
Russia has been lagging in several indicators of reform success - life expectancy, enterprise 
restructuring, labour productivity, cumulative GDP growth, and inflation stabilization – despite 
undergoing the largest privatisation in history. The standard interpretation, based on initial 
evidence, is that while Russian reformers had successfully changed the ownership structure away 
from state hands, the emergence and entrenchment of widespread insider privatisation, combined 
with the lack of development of capital market institutions to exercise ownership discipline, 
meant that privatisation had little impact on either performance or restructuring.  
 
We attempt to shed more light on current understanding of determinants of enterprise 
performance by examining a more recent data set and by linking variables that have been 
previously treated separately in the literature. First, we use data from the first large scale random 
sample conducted in Russia since the mid-1990s on enterprise restructuring. The underlying 
assumption is that having been collected 5 years after the end of privatisation and almost a 
decade after the beginning of transition, this data will be more reliable in reflecting the impact of 
new ownership, incentive and information systems on the performance of companies. 
 
Second, we seek to account for enterprise performance by linking it to four key aspects of 
economic environment outlined in contemporary literature: enterprise ownership; governance; 
market structures and competition, and financial constraints. Controlling for other factors, we 
can identify how variation in these four aspects will lead to variation in performance across the 
observed firms. 
 
In general, the findings suggest that restructuring in Russian firms indeed remains modest, and 
productivity and investment levels – low. Results of analysis of enterprise performance 
determinants, however, do not confirm standard theoretical hypotheses. We conclude that 
ownership and performance are not correlated in Russia. It is not evident that outsider ownership William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
leads to better performance than insider ownership. Our findings do however suggest a positive 
association between restructuring and competitiveness of the market environment in which firms 
operate. Moreover, we find evidence of the binding financial constraints that exist for firms of all 
types, even though larger firms are better at obtaining short-term credit. Financial constraints 
emerge in our study as a fundamental issue for restructuring in Russian enterprises. 
 
There are strong complementarities between these factors. We find that, taken together, domestic 
monopoly power, financial constraints and to a limited extent state ownership lead to inferior 
company performance across a wide range of measures. Most strikingly, there are clear 
interactions between state ownership and market structure. State ownership leads to improved 
performance across a number of measures when there is moderate domestic competition or 
import competition. However, state ownership reduces performance when there is domestic 
monopoly power. Financial constraints also depend on the ownership structure to some extent; 
they reduce performance across a variety of measures relative to what would pertain in insider 
owned firms. 
 
The results of this work imply that despite the transfer of ownership rights, institutions providing 
managerial incentives similar to those existing in western economies have not fully evolved in 
Russia. Hence, our research suggests three major policy conclusions. Firstly, as economic 
activities of Russian enterprises tend to be restricted to local and regional markets by 
administrative barriers, we suggest that the state policy should include additional measures 
limiting regional administrative barriers. Secondly, in view of strong tendencies of integration 
and cross-ownership in Russian industry, further facilitation of competition is necessary by 
lowering barriers to foreign competitors. Finally, to alleviate the problem of financing 
investment, we suggest that the government should promote equity financing by establishing 
modern corporate governance legislation and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Successful transition in Russia has always been viewed as one of the most important and 
exacting tasks facing post-communist reformers in Central and Eastern Europe, and their 
Western advisors.  The process of transition was anyway seen to be daunting in relatively more 
open and reformed economies like Hungary or Poland (see Blanchard et al (1991), Portes et al 
(1993)).  The huge scale and long communist traditions of Russia made obstacles to reform 
appear almost insurmountable; a view apparently confirmed when the reform process appeared 
to founder in the face of the August 1998 crash (see EBRD (1999)).   However, reforms in 
Russia have included the largest privatisation in history (see Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny (1995)), 
which transferred ownership in tens of thousands of companies across the country. 
 
Initial evidence suggested that, while Russian reformers had successfully changed the ownership 
structure away from state hands, the emergence and entrenchment of widespread insider 
privatisation, combined with the lack of development of capital market institutions to exercise 
ownership discipline, meant that privatisation had little impact on either company performance 
or restructuring.  This finding was deduced in a number of studies during the mid 1990s (e.g. 
Earle and Estrin (1997), Estrin and Wright (1999) and has become the standard interpretation in 
a number of important surveys (e.g. Nellis (2000), Djankov and Murrell (2000)).  The problem 
was exacerbated by the low levels of competition in Russia caused by the unfavourable 
enterprise size distribution bequeathed by planners, large distances and poor transport 
infrastructure, as well as regional policies (see Brown and Earle (2001)). 
 
However, these results were all derived from enterprise surveys undertaken only one or two 
years after privatisation (1993 – 1996).  This was also the period when firms were seeking to 
recover from disorganisation (see Blanchard and Kremer (1997)).  Moreover given the long 
heritage of communism and planning, they were undertaken too early to deduce definitive 
conclusions on the impact of the new ownership, incentive and information systems on the 
performance of companies.
2  We were therefore motivated to undertake a second large-scale 
enterprise survey, based to some extent on the first survey undertaken by the World Bank in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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1994 (see Commander, Fan and Schaffer (1996)).
3  The survey was undertaken through the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis between mid 1998 – 1999, and was carefully constructed to be a 
random sample within the population of firms considered.  The sample was relatively large – 437 
firms – and was confined to six two digit manufacturing industries; to firms employing between 
100 and 5000 workers; and to 11 regions within the four main economic zones.  Comparison 
with Goskomstat data confirms that our sample is reasonably representative of the relevant 
national patterns. 
 
Our conceptual framework follows the literature in seeking to link enterprise performance to four 
key aspects of the economic environment; ownership; governance; market structures and 
competition, and financial constraints.  One can conceive of enterprises pre-reform as operating 
away from profit maximising equilibrium in two senses.  First, levels of output, employment and 
perhaps capital would exceed those implied by a profit-maximising rule, because of planners 
preference for giganticism (see e.g. Bennett (1989)).  Secondly, firms would be operating well 
within their production possibility frontiers because of weak managerial incentives.  The reform 
process represents a number of major changes to the economic environment, leading to 
adjustments in output, inputs, prices and total factor productivity.  Once sectoral and regional 
factors have been controlled for, one can identify the four areas in which variation in the 
environment will lead to dispersion in the pattern of behaviour. 
 
The first concerns ownership structure.  In principle the propositions here are straightforward – 
private ownership will improve monitoring, help to resolve the principal-agent problem which 
allows poor managerial performance and sharpen incentives (see Vickers and Yarrow (1995)).  
As a result, one would expect privately owned firms to perform better than state owned ones – in 
terms of total factor productivity and therefore profitability, unit costs and financial performance. 
 
The situation was not quite so straightforward in Russia however.  Privatisation was mainly to 
insiders – workers and managers – whose incentives to improve performance were more 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 A point stressed in the papers themselves see e.g. Earle and Estrin (1997); Introduction. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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ambiguous (see Earle and Estrin (1996)).  Indeed, perhaps the fundamental problem in Russia is 
that privatisation yielded effective control over enterprises to managers, who on average faced 
dispersed insider (worker) or outsider (investment funds, former workers, banks) owners.   
However it did not give them sufficient ownership – typically less than 10% of the total stock 
(see Earle and Estrin (1997)).  In consequence, the incentives to restructure and improve 
profitability were frequently outweighed by those to expropriate the assets for themselves (see 
Stiglitz (1999)). 
 
All this implies that one cannot simply compare performance in state and private firms, without 
also taking into account carefully the ownership structure – insider or outsider, manager or 
worker, dispersed or concentrated.  Moreover, ownership itself is not necessarily the key – 
control and mechanisms of corporate governance also play a significant part in ensuring private 
ownership can deliver improved performance.  In the survey, we therefore included very detailed 
information on the structure of ownership, as well as its evolution through time, and on systems 
for corporate governance, including managerial evaluations of the balance of influences over 
major enterprise decisions. 
 
The third major area that can impact on company performance is the competitiveness of the 
market environment.  In general, even when corporate governance is weak, enterprises can be 
forced to improve performance by tough competition in their market.  This of course depends in 
part on the effectiveness of the bankruptcy threat, and the monopoly rentals available to the firms 
(see Nickell (1996)).  Several outcomes are feasible.  Firms operating in more competitive 
environments may face pressures to restructure but be unable to find the revenues to do so, while 
their more monopolistic competitors may be able to finance improved performance.  At the end 
of the day, the direction of the relationship between competitive pressure and company 
performance is an empirical question, and one which seems likely to interact with ownership 
structure (see Angelucci et al (2001)). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 There have been other surveys of Russian firms, in the past three years, on a variety of issues including innovation, 
corruption, and the new-market economy.  None have returned to the fundamental theme of the determinants of 
company performance, based around a large scale random survey. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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The role of bankruptcy and the need for funding from profits illustrates our final area of concern 
– financial constraints.  Much of the previous discussion implicitly assumes that capital is 
available at a fixed interest rate at infinitely elastic supply.  In practice in Russia this is not true – 
capital is scarce and allocated more by rationing than price.  These exogonous financial 
constraints can of course restrict restructuring and directly influence total factor productivity and 
company performance. 
 
In this paper, we use the data from our stratified random sample to look separately at the four 
influences on company performance.  In the following section, we introduce our methodology 
and data set, before considering ownership and corporate governance in the third section.   
Competition and performance are addressed in the fourth section and the effects of financial 
constraints in the fifth.  The sixth section attempts to bring our findings together by drawing a 
picture of a “successful” Russian enterprise while conclusions, including interactive effects and 
policy findings are contained in the seventh section. 
 
2. Survey  Methodology 
 
Our survey was designed to enable the analysis of the relationships between performance, 
ownership, corporate governance, restructuring, and finance among privatised Russian 
enterprises. The questionnaire was developed between mid-1998 and end-1999. It was tested in 
two pilot runs in 1998 and the beginning of 2000 with significant corrections made after the first 
pilot and some minor changes after the second one. Following this second pilot, the full survey 
was undertaken in the Spring of 2000. We surveyed 437 enterprises which were randomly 
sampled from a population list stratified in the manner explained in sub-section 2 below.  Given 
the focus of this study, and the resultant stratification and sampling criteria, our sample was 
never intended to be representative of Russian industry. Nonetheless, sub-section 3 presents a 
comparison of the major indicators of our sampled firms with those of the Russian industrial 
population in order to give some assessment of our sample biases. Sub-section 4 concludes. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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2.1 Questionnaire and Survey Data 
The survey data were collected by direct face-to-face interviews with one of the top-managers of 
the enterprise: in most of the cases the general manager (director/general director) or 
economic/financial director.
 4 The distribution of respondents by position is given in table 2.1 
below. However, owing to the detailed nature of the requested quantitative data, this section of 
the survey was generally collected separately from the accounting or economic department of the 
enterprise. 
 
Table 2.1 Position of the respondent  
Position of respondent  Freq.  Percent  Cum(%) 
     
Director 189  43.3  43.25 
Deputy director  218  49.9  93.14 
Other top management  30  6.9  100.00 
     
Total 437  100.00   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The questionnaire includes six major blocks of questions: 
 
•   indicators of economic activity and factors of production (output, capacity and labor 
utilization, costs, financial in- and outflows, structure of assets, investment activity, 
etc.); 
•   information on restructuring activities of the enterprise (such as shedding of labor, 
introduction of new technologies, new products, etc.); 
•   market structure data (competition, price elasticity, enterprise activity on different 
geographical markets); 
                                                 
4 In Russia the top manager position may have different names In the ‘Director’ category we include: Director 
General, Executive Director, Acting Director, Director (if he is the only one with a title). In 3 cases respondents 
were presidents of the company and in one — the Chairman of the Board. The category ‘Deputy director’ includes 
Deputies of the top manager and in one case Chief Engineer. In the ‘other’ category there are mostly Heads of 
Departments (Planning, Economic, etc.) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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•   ownership and corporate governance data (ownership structure, ownership 
concentration, board composition, some information on top-management of the 
enterprise); 
•   data on financial constraints (availability of external financing, state assistance, etc.); 
•   a block of control variables such as region, industrial code, legal type of enterprise, 
date and method of privatization and others. 
 
Where feasible, the data was generally collected for the years 1997-1999: hence the sample 
covered both pre- and post-crisis years. The general principle for composing the questionnaire 
was to duplicate information regarded as most important; hence e.g., more than one question 
(quantitative, rank, qualitative) would be included to permit construction of an indicator for main 
characteristics of the firm
5. 
 
2.2 Sampling Strategy 
From the very beginning the results of this survey were not designed to be representative of the 
Russian economy nor even of Russian industry. The survey was carried out to enable evaluation 
of the adjustment of Russian privatised industrial enterprises to new conditions in the transitional 
economy of the late 1990s. This rationale together with the restricted number of enterprises 
surveyed (400 enterprises were to be interviewed) led to the sample having some specific 
features. Moreover the general population of the firms from which the sample was drawn was 
limited to enterprises in certain industries, size, regions, form of ownership and age (date of 
establishment of the enterprise). The precise nature of these criteria are explained in detail in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
2.2.1 Selection  of  Industries 
The sample was confined to the population of firms that belong to manufacturing industries 
according to Russian Industrial Classification (OKONH). The following two-digit industries 
were selected: 
13 - Chemical & Oil-chemical industry; William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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14 - Machinery building & metal-working industry; 
15- Wood & Paper industry; 
16 – Stone & Clay (Production of building materials) industry; 
17 - Light industry; 
18 - Food industry. 
 
It should be noted that the list does not include the Ferrous and Non-Ferrous metal industries. 
These were excluded for several reasons. Firstly, as the Russian Industrial Classification does not 
separate mining and metal production at the two-digit level, the decision to exclude extractive 
industries precluded the inclusion of metal production. Secondly, the concentration of production 
in the Ferrous metal industry is extremely high (12 Russian metal plants produce about 90% of 
ferrous metal; the Non-Ferrous metal sector concentration is lower but still very high). 
Moreover, metal industry enterprises tend to be large, and hence well above our upper size limit 
(which is justified below). Consequently it would prove almost impossible to obtain a 
statistically valid sample for these industries. In addition, as metal plants are unusually export 
oriented (export share of 80-95 percent), any comparisons between them and other firms would 
prove rather difficult and uninteresting for our purposes. 
 
As a result the industrial stratification was chosen such that the sample would be approximately 
evenly distributed across our chosen two-digit industries. However, in practice it proved 
extremely difficult to meet these quotas for some industries, particularly given the need to 
sample privatised enterprises whilst adhering to the size and regional stratification dimensions. 
The actual distribution is reported in table 2.2 below, and illustrates that our sample slightly 
over-represents the machinery sector relative to the industrial population. Nonetheless, there are 
sufficient observations in each industry to control for industry-specific factors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 For some questions where pilot surveys showed  a low response rate several options were given to respondent. For 
example, if it was impossible to get information on separate shares for workers and managers the revised instrument 
included an option to report the cumulative share of insiders. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 2.2 Distribution by Industry 
Industry Code  Observations  % 
 
Chemicals 13  56  12.8 
Machinery 14  108  24.7 
Wood 15  66  15.1 
Stone&clay 16  72  16.5 
Light 17  72  16.5 
Food 18  63  14.4 
Total   437  100 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
2.2.2 Size  Categories 
To make our surveyed enterprises more comparable, we restricted the size of our sampled firms 
to between 100-5000 employees
6. Small enterprises with below 100 employees were excluded 
because: (a) they work under specific tax and accounting rules that often make them 
incomparable with others; (b) although extremely important for market institutions in the long 
run — c.f. Poland — they currently account for less that 4 percent of industrial output in Russia, 
and (c) the Russian SME sector — which has been extensively surveyed for specific SME 
studies by different researchers in recent years — generally necessitates larger, more specific 
samples, and was not the focus of this particular study.  
 
The upper size limit of 5000 employees was chosen as there are a small number of such big firms 
in most of the industries, and most have unique features that makes them more suitable for case-
studies than for statistical analysis.
7 Very large firms in Russia are often located in so called 
mono-towns, which leads to a very specific type of behaviour and is reflected in their 
performance. Moreover, very big firms tend to not exist in the same economic environment as 
                                                 
6 Employment was selected as a measure of size in accordance with both Russian legislation for separating SMEs 
and large enterprises, and common practice. 
7 See P.Kuznetsov, A.Muraviev ‘Ownership structure and firm performance in Russia's industrial firms’ for an 
example of a recent econometric approach to the analysis of very big Russian firms (‘blue chips’).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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other enterprises, but instead form their own environment to suit their interests: e.g., owing to a 
special kind of relationship with authorities, natural monopolies, and so on .
8 
 
As in the case of the industrial stratification, our aim was to distribute our sample more or less 
evenly across three broad size categories: 100-500 employees, 501-1000 employees and 1001-
5000 employees. As table 2.3 below illustrates, this stratification was broadly met by the actual 
sample. 
 
Table 2.3 Distribution by Size in 1999 
 Total  100-500  %  501-1000 %  >1000  % 
Selected Industries, 
observations 
437  147 33.6% 139 31.8% 151 34.6% 
Average size 
(employees) 
891  265  703   1820   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
2.2.3  Selection of Regions 
Our choice of regions was based on two considerations. The limited number of enterprises to be 
sampled was insufficient to get representative sub-samples for all or even the majority of regions 
(oblast, kray, republics) of Russia (89 subjects). On the other hand the regional dimension of the 
entrepreneurial and investment climates in Russia are acknowledged by most researchers, and 
hence the regional dimension should be included in any analysis. The palliative solution chosen 
was to select a limited number of regions belonging to four macro-zones: European Russia, the 
Volga, the Urals and Siberia. European Russia was represented by two Russian capitals — 
Moscow and St-Petersburg — together with their respective oblasts (Moscow oblast and St-
Petersburg oblast); three regions belong to Volga macro-zone — Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, 
Volgograd; the Ural macro-zone is also represented by three regions — Chelyabinsk, Perm, 
                                                 
8 The initial list of enterprises from which the sample was drawn was based on the Goskomstat Enterprise Registry 
data included in ALBA-Y database. The registry includes information for about 30,000 medium and large Russian 
industrial enterprises, accounting for 65-85 percent of output and employment in the selected industries. Utilising 
this database enabled us to use historical time series data in the analysis and at the same time did not significantly 
narrow the population of firms to select from.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovskaya oblast), while the Siberia macro-zone included enterprises from 
Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Omsk. 
 
We recognize, however, that our approach does not permit reliable analysis of all regional 
specifics. In particular, regional policies can differ significantly within one macro-zone 
(Tatarstan, Uliyanovsk and Nizhny Novgorod regions in Volga zone provide good and well 
known examples). Nevertheless, in many cases the geographical position itself and the distance 
from the centre are likely to be factors contributing to the macro-zone economic environment 
and enterprise behavior.  
 
Nonetheless, we did not apply strict regional quotas, having decided that for the purposes of this 
study the size and industrial stratifications were the most important criteria. Indeed we initially 
aimed to survey in only eight regions across our four macro-zones. One region in each macro-
zone was ‘reserved’ for use if the size and industry quotas could not be met in two regions. This 
strategy resulted in some regions (‘reserved’ ones) having a relatively smaller number of 
observations. Table 2.4 below shows the regional structure of the sample. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 2.4 Regional Distribution 
Region  No. of Firms  % of Total 
    
    
Central macro-zone subtotal  122  27.9 
Moscow 36  8.2% 
Moscow oblast  41  9.4% 
St-Peterburg   30  6.9% 
St-Peterburg oblast  15  3.4% 
    
Volga macro-zone subtotal  115  26.3% 
Nizhny Novgorod oblast 64  14.6% 
Samara oblast  39  8.9% 
Volgograd oblast  12  2.7% 
    
Ural macro-zone subtotal  111  25.4% 
Ekaterinburg oblast  50  11.4% 
Perm oblast  43  9.8% 
Chelyabinsk oblast  18  4.1% 
    
Siberia macro-zone subtotal  89  20.4% 
Krasnoyarsk kray  37  8.5% 
Novosibirsk oblast  40  9.2% 
Omsk oblast  12  2.7% 
    
Total 437  100.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
2.2.4  Establishment Year and Form of Ownership 
As our analysis is concerned with post-privatisation behaviour, changes in ownership and 
corporate governance at former Soviet industrial enterprises, only those enterprises in existence 
before 1992 (the beginning of transitional reforms in Russia) were eligible for selection. Hence William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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enterprises organized after 1992 as spin-offs of former Soviet ones were excluded. Irrespective 
of this choice, the vast majority of de novo firms were excluded as a result of the lower size 
restriction which prevented SMEs from entering the sample. Preliminary analysis showed that 
the number of big (more than 100 employees) de novo firms in the selected industries and 
regions in Russia is so small as to preclude the possibility of obtaining a representative sample of 
such enterprises. 
 
Similarly, the focus of our research on the problems and behavioral patterns of privatised 
enterprises necessitated the exclusion of fully state-owned enterprises that were never privatised. 
At the same time our population included ‘mixed’ state-private joint-stock companies even in 
cases where the controlling share of stock belongs to Federal or Regional authorities. 
 
2.3 Does  the  Sample Represent the Population of Firms? 
Table 2.5 below compares the results of our sample to the official Goskomstat data for industrial 
enterprises. From this it is quite evident that our quotas for industries led to certain selection 
biases: some industries with a smaller number of enterprises (Chemicals and Stone & Clay) are 
‘over-represented’ relative to others (Machinery Building, Light and Food industries). This is 
true not only for the number of enterprises but for employment and sales data as well
9.  As our 
enterprises are on average much larger than those in the total population, the average levels of 
employment and sales are naturally much higher. 
 
The most important conclusion comes from comparing the sales to employment ratio for our 
sample against the population. In general our surveyed enterprises tend to have much higher per 
capita sales than Russian industrial firms. There are two possible explanations for this: larger 
                                                 
9 The low values for the percentage of surveyed enterprises in the total population are mostly due to the fact that we 
are comparing our sample with the total enterprise population including SME. We are using the total number of 
firms just to be able to compare employment and sales coverage ratio (as sales and employment data by size groups 
is unavailable. In Table A1 the number of observations in the sample is compared to number of medium and large 
firms in respective industries which provides a better assessment. W
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enterprises may have higher sales per worker, hence the exclusion of very small firms may have 
induced a bias in our average, and/or enterprises in our sample tend to be more productive than 
the average Russian firm in the same industry. Analysis of our data set at the aggregate 
levelrevealed a positive and highly significant correlation between the sales to employment ratio 
and size for all three years of our sample.
10 However, more detailed analysis revealed that while 
this is true at the aggregate level, it is not true for every industrial sector. Productivity was found 
to be highly positively correlated with size in the Food and Wood industries; the correlation was 
positive but insignificant in the case of the Chemicals and Machinery sectors, while there was an 
insignificant negative correlation in the case of the Stone & Clay and Light industries. 
 
This sectoral heterogeneity suggests that our aggregate bias cannot simply be a function of  our 
size stratification. The results presented in table 2.6 below calculate the profit/sales ratio by 
industry as a weighted average. 
 
Table 2.6 Profitability Comparison 
   1997  1998  1999 
 No.  Obs.  GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
Chemical  51 2.8 3.7 7.8 9.3  12.5  17.7 
Machinery  98 8.0 10.9  10.0 8.9  8.0  11.4 
Wood 55  -5.5  9.5  5.0  14.5  11.7  21.3 
Stone&clay  64 5.6 9.1 5.2 8.4 4.3  10.2 
Light  68  -1.5 1.1 0.9 3.9 4.5  10.9 
Food  53  8.4  10.9 12.8 13.0  5.0 10.4 
Total  Industry  389   7.7   10.4    13.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
10 Using our data set for checking the hypothesis implies that the relationship is the same outside of our 100-5000 
employees interval. However, it is not clear that this is true. On the other hand small enterprises in Russia 
(especially in Food and Light sectors where they can deal with customers in cash) are notorious for being deeply 
involved into shadow economy and not showing their real output. For 1997 for all industry sales/employment ratio 
of small enterprises was less than 50% of large and medium sized enterprises.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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From this it can be seen that our bias is generally in favour of more profitable firms. The most 
prominent differences occur in the Wood & Paper and Stone & Clay sectors. However, the 
dynamic of the profitability indicator generally corresponds to the national level trend (with the 
exception of the Stone & Clay sector). Consequently it would appear that while we chose more 
profitable firms than average in the first instance, their performance trends have been 
representative of the population. 
 
Nonetheless, transition economies in general, and Russia in particular, are notorious for the poor 
quality of enterprise profits data, as a result of extensive tax evasion. Similarly we are aware that 
these same biases are likely to appear in our survey data. As the number of observations in 
industries is not very high, one mistake may lead to significant bias in means. However, if we 
merely compare the share of profit and loss makers in the sample with the share in the industrial 
populations, as in table 2.7 below, we confirm the suggestion of a bias in favor of more 
profitable enterprises.  
 
Table 2.7 Share of Profit-Making Enterprises 
 1997  1998  1999 
 GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
GKS 
(%) 
Survey 
(%) 
Chemical  na  79.2 51.5 75.5 67.7 86.3 
Machinery  na  71.0 53.5 72.6 64.8 81.4 
Wood  na  59.3 31.9 53.6 49.0 73.2 
Stone&clay  na  76.2 43.1 65.6 53.1 73.8 
Light  na  63.1 38.2 71.6 50.9 80.6 
Food  na  91.3 56.5 77.1 63.4 87.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In 1997 at the aggregate level 76 percent of the sample were profit makers compared with 53 
percent for Russian industry. The corresponding numbers for 1998 and 1999 are 74 percent 
against 51 percent, and 76 percent against 60 percent in 1999 respectively. The dynamic profit-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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makers share of the indicator generally corresponds to the national level trend with the exception 
of  Stone & Clay.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
From the above discussion we are able to establish several features of our sample: 
 
•   On the average the sample is reasonably evenly distributed across size classes and 
industries. In general the time trend in most cases follow national level patterns.  
•   The regional distribution of the sample is approximately even across our four macro-
zones. However, several regions are underrepresented (Volgograd and Omsk in 
particular). Consequently any analysis of regional differences should control for this. 
•   The average size of the surveyed enterprises is larger than industrial average. This 
appears to be a result of the initial selection bias and sampling strategy (size quotas). 
•   Our sample over-represents better performing enterprises. This can be partially explained 
(at least for some industries) by the size structure of sample: bigger enterprises are in 
general more productive.  Nonetheless, this bias probably is due to the well-known fact 
that badly performing enterprises tend to refuse to be surveyed more often than better 
performing ones.  
•   For some industries (Wood & Paper being the most obvious) the sample means and time 
trends differ significantly with official Goskomstat data. W
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3.  Ownership, Control, Performance and Restructuring 
 
3.1 Ownership and Control 
For most of our analysis, we distinguish between three main categories of owners: insiders, the 
state (both Federal and Regional government), and outsiders (the remainder).  Insiders are further 
subdivided into workers and managers when this is possible (about two-thirds of cases).  Table 
3.1 groups firms by majority shareholder group, majority defined as the group accounting for 50 
percent or more of shares. At the time of privatisation, 79 percent of firms were under the control 
of insiders and 9 percent were controlled by outsiders.  The small fraction that still had majority 
state-ownership simply reflects our sampling strategy (majority private ownership only).  By the 
start of 2000, the percentage of firms that were insider-owned had fallen to 60 percent, and the 
outsider-owned share portion had increased to 31 percent. 
 
Table 3.1 Ownership by Majority Shareholding Group 
  At time of 
privatization 
At 1.1.00 
 Number 
of firms 
% of 
firms 
Number 
of firms 
% of 
firms 
Insider-owned 279  79.3 217  59.5 
Outsider-owned 31  8.8 112  30.7 
State-owned 25  7.1 13  3.6 
No overall ownership  17  4.8 23  6.3 
Total 352  100.0 365  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The changes in share ownership since the time of privatisation are detailed in table 3.2. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 3.2 Change in Share Ownership by Major Category 
  At time of 
privatization 
At 1.1.00  Change 
 Number 
of firms 
% of 
shares 
Number 
of firms 
% of 
shares 
Number 
of firms 
% of 
shares 
Insiders, of which:  351 71.8 364  62.3  339  -9.5 
  Managers  216 12.7 229  17.7  201  3.8 
  Workers  216 54.0 229  34.5  201  -19.9 
Outsiders  351 16.0 364 32.0  339 16.1 
State 351 12.2 364  5.7  339  -6.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Although there has been a decline in shareholdings by insiders overall, this masks a large decline 
in worker ownership vs. an increase in share ownership by managers.  Outsider ownership has 
doubled since privatisation, and now accounts for about one-third of shares, almost as much as 
workers and considerably more than managers.  About half of the shares owned by outsiders are 
under the ownership of other Russian firms, with the rest divided between banks and investment 
companies, foreign firms, and ‘others’. Outsider ownership is closely correlated with 
concentrated ownership: 38 percent of outsider-owned firms had 2-3 shareholders controlling 50 
percent or more of the shares, vs. only 7 percent of insider-owned firms.  Outsiders tend to hold 
small stakes in firms that remain insider-controlled; the average outsider shareholding in insider-
owned firms is only 11 percent, vs. the 24 percent of shares owned by insiders in outsider-owned 
firms. 
 
Our survey is unusual in that we have detailed information about the composition of the board in 
most of the surveyed firms, albeit only for the date of the survey (mid-2000). Table 3.3 groups 
firms according to which group — managers, workers, state, outsiders — have a majority of 
seats on the board. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 3.3 Control of the Board by Majority Group 
 Number 
of firms 
% of firms 
Manager-controlled 129 32.8
Worker-controlled 95 24.2
Outsider-controlled 94 23.9
State-controlled 7 1.8
No overall control  68 17.3
Total 393 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Our results illustrate that majority control is relatively evenly divided amongst firms in the 
sample, with managers having a majority of seats in one-third of firms, and workers and 
outsiders each having a majority of seats in about one-quarter of firms. 
 
The relationship between share ownership and size of the firm shows the expected patterns (table 
3.4).  Outsider ownership is increasing with firm size, as is state ownership.   The same pattern is 
apparent in the relationship between the share of seats on the board and the size of the firm. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 3.4 Share Ownership and Board Control by Size of Firm 
 Number 
of firms 
% of shares 
owned, 
all firms 
% of shares owned, 
by number of employees 
     <  501  501-1000  1000+ 
Insiders, of which:  354 62.3 71.6  62.1 52.2
  Managers  225 17.5 20.9  17 13.6
  Workers  225 34.6 37.1  36.8 28.6
Outsiders 354 31.9 25.2  31.3 40.1
State 354 5.7 3.2  6.6 7.7
  
  % of board 
seats, 
all firms 
% of board seats, 
by number of employees 
     < 501  501-1000  1000+ 
Insiders, of which:  376 67.8 75.1  66.6 61.1
  Managers  376 38.9 40.0  40.0 36.4
  Workers  376 28.9 35.0  26.6 24.6
Outsiders 376 27.0 20.9  28.8 31.7
State 376 5.2 4.0  4.6 7.2
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Finally, table 3.5 presents the relation between ownership and control at the start of 2000. Each 
row of the table calculate the percentage of firms controlled by insiders, outsiders and the state 
respectively, for each ownership category. Hence the first row of the table illustrates that more 
than 89 percent of insider-owned firms were controlled by insiders at board level at the start of 
2000. By contrast just over 9 percent of insider-owned firms were controlled by outsiders and 
almost no insider owned firms were controlled by the state. Interesting we find that more than 
one-third of firms with majority state ownership were actually controlled by insiders. Possibly 
the most interesting result relates to the high proportion of outsider-owned firms that were 
actually controlled by insiders at board level: while just over 58 percent of outsider-owned firms William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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were also controlled by outsiders, the remaining 41.8 percent were actually controlled by insiders 
at the start of 2000. The results therefore illustrate that, most probably as a result of the mass 
privatisation programme, there remained a significant distinction between ownership and control 
in privatised Russian enterprises at the start of 2000.  
 
Table 3.5  Relation Between Ownership and Control 
Ownership  Control (% of ownership category) 
 
  
 Insider  Outsider  State 
Insider 89.7  9.3  0.1 
Outsider 41.8  58.2 0.0 
State 37.5  16.7  33.3 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
3.2 Ownership, Control and Performance 
We have calculated the means of a large number of different measures of enterprise performance 
by category of ownership and control; a selection of these appears in Table 3.6.  In all cases we 
have addressed the problem of extreme values or “outliers” by Winsorizing the upper and lower 
2.5 percent of the sample.
11   
 
                                                 
11 Winsorizing is an old-fashioned but robust procedure in which observations in the upper and lower tails are 
identified, but instead of removing these observations they are assigned the value of the cut-off defining the tail.  For 
example, we have Winsorized at 2.5 percent, so if the cut-off point for the upper 2.5 percent of the distribution is X, 
then the observations with a value greater than X that make up 2.5 percent of the sample are reassigned a value of X, 
and similarly for the lower 2.5 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  23 
 
Table 3.6 Performance and Restructuring 
  Performance measures (1) 
 
 Value-added  per 
worker, 1999 
Real log sales 
growth, 2 years 
Log 
employment 
growth, 2 years
Real log 
productivity 
growth, 2 years 
Total  65.8 -8.7 -7.5 -3.7 
 
By ownership:       
  Insider owned  62.7  -7.4  -9.3  -1.8 
  Outsider owned  64.9  -10.7  -9.9  -3.2 
  State owned  103.1  4.9  -3.7  -8.2 
  No overall ownership  68.4  -17.7  -7.3  -8.3 
 
By board control:       
  Manager-controlled  69.1  -6.5  9.1  -4.3 
  Worker-controlled  59.7  -12.2  9.9  -2.9 
  Outsider-controlled  71.7  -7.3  7.6  0.4 
  State-controlled  82.4  -23.3  2.7  -27.5 
  No overall control  64.4  -4.6  7.2  -4.5 
Note: Real growth rates calculated using the official industrial price deflator (average price level per year): 
7.9% (1997), 57.7% (1998).  Average price level per year calculated from cumulative monthly price changes. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
  Performance measures (2)  Average composite 
restructuring index 
 Investment 
rate (I/K) 
ROE Export  share, 
% 
Deep Defensive 
Total  7.4 16.9  4.4 61.9  49.0 
 
By ownership:         
  Insider owned  6.2  17.6  4.8  62.2  49.5 
  Outsider owned  7.8  9.6  4.3  61.4  55.8 
  State owned  4.5  22.1  7.4  58.3  58.0 
  No overall ownership  6.5  15.2  2.6  54.9  51.4 
 
By board control:         
  Manager-controlled  6.5  21.6  5.2  58.6  45.1 
  Worker-controlled  8.2  14.6  4.8  61.6  49.9 
  Outsider-controlled  8.1  14.0  3.9  64.6  54.9 
  State-controlled  5.4  20.0  9.0  57.0  52.8 
  No overall control  6.7  12.7  4.1  64.1  50.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In the case of ownership, the small numbers of firms that are state-owned or that have no single 
group with at least 50 percent ownership entails that the means for these groups should be treated 
with caution.  The more reliable comparison is between the performance of insider-owned vs. 
outsider-owned firms.  The main result that comes from the table is that the differences in 
performance between these two category of firms are minor; the only exception being 
profitability, where insider-owned firms are significantly more profitable than outsider-owned 
firms.  This finding is confirmed by more rigorous statistical testing: in the case of both simple 
pairwise comparisons (correlation of ownership vs. performance) and comparisons of 
performance between the two ownership categories, controlling for the size, location, and 
industrial sector of the firm, the only significant difference to be found between insider- and 
outsider-owned firms is in the higher profitability of the latter.  Productivity levels, sales growth, 
employment growth, productivity growth, investment rates, and export activity, are all William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  25 
 
statistically indistinguishable between the two groups.  Missing data and the relatively small 
number of manager-owned firms means we were not able to examine the differences between 
these two categories of insider-owned firms. 
 
We were, however, able to look at the differences in performance between manager-controlled, 
worker-controlled, and outsider-controlled firms, where control is defined as a majority of seats 
on the board.  The findings here are essentially the same as for ownership: with the exception of 
profitability, there are no significant differences between manager-, worker-, and outsider-
controlled firms in terms of performance, whether or not characteristics of firms are controlled 
for (the poorer performance of worker-controlled firms in sales and productivity growth is in fact 
not statistically significant, because the cross-sectional variation in these measures is very large).  
Profitability, by contrast, is significantly higher in manager-controlled firms, not only compared 
to outsider-controlled firms but also compared to worker-controlled firms, and there is no 
difference between the latter two groups.  This pattern is statistically significant, whether or not 
characteristics such as size, industry and location are controlled for. The positive correlation 
between profitability and insider ownership/managerial control carries through if we look at the 
correlation between the proportion of shares owned/board seats held and profitability. However, 
it doesn’t carry through to the subsample of firms for which we have separate manager and 
employee ownership, where the correlation loses any statistical significance. 
 
The nature of the causality underlying this correlation between profitability and managerial 
control/insider ownership is not clear.  The impact of the nature of ownership and control on firm 
performance is difficult to separate from the impact of performance on ownership and control.  
We looked at, for example, the correlation between high profitability at the time of the survey 
and changes in the portions of share ownership belonging to the different groups in question.  
High profitability is significantly correlated with an increase in share ownership by managers, 
but not with any other changes in ownership shares.  We have also found that the significant and 
positive correlation between profitability and insider ownership is noticeably reduced if we look 
at the correlation between current profitability and insider ownership at the time of privatisation.  
Both findings suggest that insiders, and managers in particular, may be increasing their 
ownership shares in firms that are, in effect, “worth owning”.  Separating this phenomenon from 
that in which ownership or control determine performance is left for future work. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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3.3 Ownership, Control and Restructuring 
Restructuring activity is notoriously difficult to measure, but we have attempted to do so 
nonetheless.  Managers were given a long list of restructuring actions, and asked to categorise 
their firm’s restructuring activity up to 1999:  (1) engaged in a specific activity in 1997, 1998, 
and/or 1999 (separately detailed); (2) didn’t engage in this activity in 1997-99 because it was 
done prior to 1997; (3) didn’t engage in it because the firm never needed to do it; (4) didn’t 
engage in it but should have.  The responses can be combined into summary measures in a 
number of ways, but we choose to present here only one measure, based on whether the firm 
engaged in the restructuring activity at all in 1997-99.  Note that firms that did not restructure are 
a heterogeneous set, composed both of firms that say they did not do so for positive reasons (they 
didn’t need to or did so already) and of firms that provided a negative reason (they should have 
but didn’t)
12. 
 
                                                 
12 We also note that in a subjective question such as this firms responding that they recognised the need to engage in 
a restructuring measure, but failed to do so, may have positive connotations in that they recognise the need to 
restructure. Similarly, firms that report that they didn’t need to restructure may have failed to appreciate the need for 
restructuring activity to be undertaken. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  27 
 
Table 3.7 Deep and Defensive Restructuring 
Deep 
restructuring 
Total 
number 
of firms 
% of firms 
engaged in 
restructuring 
in 1997-99 
Defensive 
restructuring 
Total 
number 
of firms 
% of firms 
engaged in 
restructuring 
in 1997-99 
Introduction of 
new products and 
services 
435 54.9  Liquidation  of 
unprofitable 
products 
426 46.0 
Moves to new 
markets 
423  75.7  Cuts in social 
provision 
425 52.7 
Improved 
marketing 
428 71.7  Shedding  excess 
labour 
431 56.1 
Energy-saving 
innovation 
 
420 53.6  Sale  or  leasing-out 
of excess 
equipment 
431 45.0 
Labour and 
material-saving 
innovation 
425 52.0  Sale  or  leasing-out 
of real estate 
428 47.7 
Quality-raising 
innovation 
423 66.7       
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 3.7 presents the percentages of firms that engaged in various restructuring measures in 
1997-99, grouping measures under the headings of “deep restructuring” (e.g., introducing new 
products or moving into new markets) and “defensive restructuring” (e.g., labour shedding or 
liquidating plant or product lines).   
The percentages lie in the range of 45 percent to 75 percent, with deep restructuring measures 
typically more common than defensive ones. This could reflect a plausible sequencing in 
restructuring – deep restructuring is more common because defensive restructuring measures 
have already been done, and indeed by their nature will not be maintained continuously – but it 
could also reflect excessively optimistic thinking by respondents. 
Following Carlin et al. (2001), we have condensed these various measures of restructuring into 
composite deep and defensive restructuring indexes using the method of principal components. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  28 
 
In both cases, the eigenvector of the first principal component provides the weights to be applied 
to the component restructuring indexes when constructing the composite index.  The method also 
allows a check on whether a composite index is sensible, i.e., whether it is measuring some 
underlying deep or defensive restructuring activity. In the case of the deep restructuring 
composite index, the first principal component (out of six) explains fully 38 percent of the 
variance in the six deep restructuring indexes; the next most important component explains less 
than half that.  Similarly, the first principal component for the five defensive restructuring 
activities explains 36 percent of the variance. 
 
The last two columns of table 3.6 present the means for the two composite restructuring indexes 
by firm ownership and by board control. The indexes are normalised so that the index takes the 
value zero if a firm engaged in no restructuring measures in the period 1997-99, and the value 
100 if a firm engaged in all possible measures. As was the case with the individual restructuring 
measures, deep restructuring is more common than defensive restructuring. The two categories 
of restructuring are positively correlated (the simple correlation coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 6 percent level). With respect to ownership and control, statistical testing 
suggests that firms with outside control of the board are significantly more likely than manager-
controlled firms to engage in either deep or defensive restructuring, with worker-controlled firms 
somewhere in between. Ownership group, however, is not significantly correlated with 
restructuring activity of either sort. 
 
One aspect of the firm that does differ significantly with ownership and control is the nature of 
the manager.  Insider-owned firms tend to have general managers who have held their current 
post longer (8 years, vs. 5 years for outsider-owned firms) and who have been in the firm longer 
(20 years, vs. 15 years for outsider-owned firms).  The same applies to insider-controlled firms 
(whether manager- or worker-controlled) vs. outsider-controlled firms. This does not appear to 
be the result of a greater willingness of outside owners to sack and replace poor managers: the 
proportion of insider- and outsider-owned firms with general managers who were appointed as 
replacements for someone who was performing poorly was about 50 percent for both categories 
of firms. Control of the board, however, is clearly related to managerial turnover: 40 percent of 
manager-controlled firms replaced their manager because of poor performance, vs. 48 percent of 
worker-controlled firms, and 53 percent of outsider-controlled firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Finally, table 3.8 summarises the obstacles to the conduct of business as perceived by managers.  
The list includes obstacles originating from a wide range of sources, and only the most 
commonly cited obstacles are listed here. 
Table 3.8 The Business Environment 
      By size of firm 
Administrative or other obstacles to 
business? 
Number 
of firms 
% <501 501-
1000 
1000+
         
Yes 250  57.2 50.3 55.5  66.1 
 
of which: 
 
    
Excessive and biased activities by 
inspection bodies (health, tax, 
environmental) 
 
100 22.0 21.8 21.9  23.6 
Difficulty in obtaining licenses for new 
activities and investment 
88 20.1 15.0 19.7  26.0 
Limitations of markets by regional 
governments of other regions 
 
26 6.0 8.2 2.9  4.7 
Other 
 
46 9.1 5.3 11.0  11.8 
No 
 
177 40.5 44.2 43.8  33.1 
Difficult to say 
 
10 2.3 5.4 0.7  0.8 
Total 437  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
A surprisingly large portion of firms — over 40 percent of the sample — stated that they saw no 
such major obstacles to business.  Of the firms that did see obstacles, the most commonly cited William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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were excessive and biased activities by government inspection bodies (health, tax, 
environmental, etc.), cited as the number one obstacle by 22 percent of firms; difficulties in and 
costs of obtaining licenses, cited by 20 percent of firms; and regional protectionism, cited by 6 
percent of firms.  Surprisingly, or perhaps not, pressure from criminal groups was cited as the 
number one problem by only two firms in the entire survey.  An interesting feature of the results 
in Table 3.8 is that larger firms are more likely than small firms to complain about obstacles to 
their business activity. 
 
4. Competition,  Performance and Restructuring 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For most economists, competition is viewed as a fundamental of the market economy, and 
therefore is expected to improve enterprise performance. However, modelling to establish this 
result is rare and the analysis is often indeterminate in sign, while the empirical evidence, even 
for developed market economies, is sparse.  For example from a Schumpeterian perspective, less 
concentration will reduce rents and increase uncertainty, and this might result in a decrease of R 
& D investment, with negative effects on long run performance.  On the other hand, the threat 
from competition could instead shorten the innovation cycle (Aghion and Carlin,  (1996)). 
Moreover, firms could be forced to improve efficiency as the struggle for survival becomes 
harder.  The latter view rests heavily on the ownership and capital market arrangements; soft 
budget constraints and the absence of bankruptcy enforcement fundamentally reduce such 
competitive processes.  The same conceptual ambiguity holds with respect to managers’ 
behaviour. It is not clear whether they would react to competition by exerting more effort or 
would be discouraged by the profit reduction (Willig (1987)). Once again the institutional and 
policy environment is significant. 
 
As far as transition economies are concerned, an essential aspect of the economic environment is 
the ownership structure of the enterprise. This is because private ownership as well as 
competition may provide incentives to pursue a higher efficiency level. Private ownership is 
expected to be associated with harder budget constraints and a lower likelihood of government 
bailout in case of bankruptcy. Furthermore, privately-owned firms may be more aggressive and 
profit oriented than state-owned ones. This raises the issue of substitutability or complementarity 
of alternate policy regimes, therefore competition verses privatisation.  Competition processes William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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ultimately refer to the rents generated by the enterprise in its product market, whether domestic 
or international.  Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the impact of trade 
liberalisation on domestic competitive processes, though, in large regionally dispersed 
economies like Russia, non-tariff barriers will always also be significant.  The debate on the 
impact of alternative ownership forms has in large part focussed on the ways that such firm-
specific rents (as might be available on product markets, whatever their structure) could be 
dissipated in the absence of effective capital market disciplines into the managerial utility 
function
13.  At the start of transition, the balance of opinion favoured speedy privatisation, a 
mechanism to break the state’s monopoly of ownership and in effect a precondition to improved 
performance.  More recently, influential analysts such as Joe Stiglitz and Nick Stern have argued 
that building a more competitive market structure prior to privatisation might have been 
beneficial to performance.  These views are consistent with the hypothesis that market 
competition and privatisation are substitutes in disciplining firms and generating improved 
economic performance.  In contrast, the disappointing impact of privatisation on performance in 
much of the former Soviet Union,  indicates that they may be complements — privatisation only 
really works to improve company performance in contexts where product market competition 
has limited the scope of firm-specific rents. 
 
The empirical evidence on this matter for Russia is scarce. Earle and Estrin’s analysis (1998) 
supports the theory of complementarity between competition and privatisation, although the 
significance of the former is low.  Brown and Earle (2001) highlight the importance of the 
interplay between ownership and concentration. Their analysis, using a 1992-99 panel of Russian 
manufacturing enterprises, shows evidence of a firm-level substitution effect between 
competition and privatisation. 
 
The theoretical background is therefore too fragmented and ambiguous, and the empirical 
evidence too scarce to permit us to derive clear testable hypotheses from a complete model of 
firm behaviour vis a vis competition. In our view, the role of competition in enterprise 
performance requires more careful thought, and more attention should be devoted to 
understanding it as both a static and dynamic process. However, the aim of this paper is simply 
to provide an overview of the level and impact of competition in our sample of Russian firms. 
                                                 
13 For example to lower performance, excessive employment and unnecessary cost. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Hence no formal attempt to model the impact of domestic and foreign competition on enterprise 
behaviour and performance will be made. Rather, the focus of the present analysis will be a 
group of key variables, which are likely to be affected differently by varying degrees of 
competition. 
 
Two possible scenarios are hypothesised. Both of them rest on the assumption that competition 
hardens the constraints on firms
14. In one case, companies are expected to react to lower 
profitability by exerting more effort. Thus they will pursue restructuring and increase innovation 
in order to gain in efficiency and become more productive. According to this scenario, 
competition will be positively associated with restructuring (especially of the pro-active type), 
higher investment and innovation. Restructuring, innovation and investments should lead to 
higher efficiency and productivity.  
 
The alternative hypothesis is that enterprises (especially high-cost ones) do not react in a positive 
way to the decrease of profitability and of market share implied by tough competition, leading 
managerial effort to be reduced. In this case, firms would not engage in restructuring, at least not 
of the pro-active type
15. No major investment would be undertaken. As a consequence, efficiency 
and productivity would not increase. The likely impacts of our key variables are illustrated in 
table 4.1. 
                                                 
14 Whether emphasis is given to decreased rents and market power, reduced market share and lower demand or 
narrower profitability margins does not affect the result of the present exercise. 
15 They might still undertake defensive reforms in order to protect their position in the market in the short term 
without bearing the higher costs of a deep restructuring. 
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Table 4.1 Likely Firm Level Impacts of Competition 
 
Impact on: 
Scenario one: firms react positively 
to competition 
Scenario two: firms react negatively 
to competition 
Restructuring  ↑  (especially of the pro-active type)  ∆  = 0 (or engaged mainly in defensive 
reforms) 
Investment and innovation  ↑   ∆  = 0   or   ↓  
Efficiency and productivity  ↑   ∆  = 0   or   ↓  
Profitability  If there is an initial decrease due to 
competition, this may be 
counterbalanced to some extent 
The possible initial decrease is likely 
to remain low 
 
A further objective of this preliminary exploration is to analyse possible ownership effects which 
allow for ownership-specific impacts of competition. Hence, state-owned and privately-owned 
firms are allowed to react differently to the same competition level. This is a direct consequence 
of the fact that corporate governance affects enterprise objectives and behaviour. 
 
The discussion is organised as follows. The measures of competition used, their drawbacks and 
strength are discussed in sub-section 2. Sub-section 3 describes how the patterns of competition 
is distributed across Russian sectors and regions, as well as the size and ownership structure of 
the firm. Sub-section 4 investigates the effects of competition on restructuring and innovation; 
efficiency and productivity; profitability. Sub-section 5 concludes the analysis. 
 
4.2 Definition 
There are several issues in measuring competition in the work that follows.  The survey contains 
firms whose primary market is domestic, i.e. whose proportion of sales either at krai/oblast or 
national level exceeds 50 percent. In the whole sample only 13 firms out of 437 sell primarily 
abroad. Two measures of competition are employed: domestic and import competition. The 
former is defined as high if there are more than 5 competitors in the same market; medium if 
competing firms are between 2 and 5; low in case of monopoly or duopoly
16. The proportions of 
firms in the three categories are, respectively, 62.7, 27.5 and 9.7 percent.  Thus most firms face a 
significant degree of competition in their relevant market.  Unfortunately, the only measure of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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foreign competition available is a categorical variable that indicates whether firms face a 
significant competition from imports. Import competition is perhaps lower than one might have 
expected; around 37 percent of the sample considered it to be significant. 
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of Firms According to Domestic and Foreign Competition 
Categories 
Import competition  Domestic competition 
1=yes 0=no                    1  2  3  Total 
 
         0   144 (60%)  75 (72%)  28 (75%)  247 
 
         1  103 (40%)  31 (28%)  9 (25%)  143 
 
     Total  247  106  37  390 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Overall, 40 percent of firms with high domestic competition face significant import competition 
as well, the proportion falling down to 28 percent and 25 percent for firms in medium and low 
competitive domestic markets.  Thus import competition is acting to a modest extent to limit 
firms in a strong market position domestically.  But when there are relatively high entry barriers, 
these apply equivalently to domestic and foreign firms. The measures of competition employed 
are qualitative ones, i.e. they reflect the interviewee’s opinions on the level of competition faced 
by the enterprise.  The limitation inherent with the use of qualitative indicators lies in their 
degree of subjectivity, which may blur between-firm comparisons. Technically speaking, it is 
equivalent to the introduction of a white-noise measurement error, which might have a potential 
biasing impact.  On the other hand, enterprise insiders with their deep knowledge of firm-related 
matters, are likely to have a better insight of the true competition level faced by the firm. Perhaps 
they can better identify its main market, and its effective competitors. Market identification is a 
very complex issue, especially in case of multi-product firms, and this approach may be superior 
to the use of aggregated sectoral concentration indicators. 
 
In this respect, reassurance is provided by a comparison of our indicators with the demand 
impact of a price change. Respondents are asked what the likely demand impact of a 10 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Note how the relevant geographical dimension is employed at all times. If a market competes only at krai/oblast 
level, only its krai/oblast competitors are counted. The same applies for competition at national level. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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price increase of their major product would be. Overall, the price elasticity of demand evaluation 
appears to be consistent with the perceived competition level.  
 
If we group enterprises into two main categories, high and low competition, 62.2 percent of high-
competition firms have a sales drop greater than 10 percent, while the remaining 38.2 percent 
will have a price elasticity of demand less than 10 percent or null. The equivalent values for low-
competition enterprises are 35.5 percent and 64.5 percent.  
 
Using a more marked division, we cluster firms around high (≥ 10 percent) and null elasticity (no 
sales change), the proportion for the high-competition group are 73 percent and 27 percent, while 
those for the high-concentration one are 47 percent and 53 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 4.3 Interaction Between Competition and Price Elasticity of Demand 
Perceptions 
 Hi.  dom.+ 
for. 
Comp. 
Hi. dom. 
Comp. 
Med. 
dom.+ for. 
Comp. 
Med. 
Dom. 
Comp. 
Lo. Dom.+ 
for. 
Comp. 
Lo. Dom. 
Comp. 
Total 
sales 
drop:  
≥  10% 
57 57 17 18 1  5  155 
sales 
drop:  
≈  10% 
19 24 2  7  3  5  60 
sales 
drop:  
< 10% 
10 30 2  24 3  4  73 
sales will 
not 
change 
13 43 9  25 1  15 106 
Total  99 154  30 74 8  29 394 
 
Possible 
groupings: 
       
≥ 10%  62.2%  35.5%  
<10% 
+∆ =0 
37.8%  64.5%   
Total   100%  100%   
≥ 10%  73%  47%  
∆ =0  27%  53%   
Total   100%  100%   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In both cases, a clustering of high sales change for very competitive firms and low or no change 
for highly concentrated enterprises can be clearly noted. This is suggestive of a substantial level 
of homogeneity in the perspective of the true competition level faced by the firm, and more 
importantly, perhaps, that the subjective indicator of competition is related to management's 
perception of the firm's marginal revenue function. 
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4.3 Nature of Competition in Russia 
Earle and Estrin (1998) and Brown and Earle (2001) argue that competition is linked to location, 
because firms and industries may not be randomly distributed across regions. Hence, strategic 
location may favour concentration through high transportation and geographical costs. The 
following table illustrates the distribution of firms by competition level across region, industry, 
size and ownership structure.  
 
Commencing with table 4.4, there is little striking in our sample concerning domestic 
competition.  The only region where high levels of domestic competition are significantly more 
common is Krasroyarsk (assuming we combine St Petersburg city with its region).  High levels 
of domestic concentration are more common in the more isolated industrial or natural resource 
centres - Samara, Chelyabinsk, and perhaps Perm.  The results on import competition also 
conform with expectations.  Rather more firms in Moscow and in the Moscow region than 
average face significant import competition.  Among the regions, only firms in Nizhny 
Novgorod face stiffer than average import competition.  Interestingly, in our sample, the 
pressures of import competition are below average in St. Petersburg and its region, as well as in 
the other industrial centres. 
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Table 4.4 Regional Distribution of Firms by Competition Level 
| domestic comp 1=hi 2=med 3=lo import comp. 1=yes
| (if sal>50%ru/obt) 0=no
code of the region | 1 2 3 | Total 0 1 | Total
moscow | 24 8 4 | 36 18 17 | 35
moscow region | 22 14 3 | 39 18 22 | 40
st.-petersburg | 14 9 6 | 29 20 9 | 29
st.-petersburg region | 8 2 0 | 10 10 4 | 14
nizhny novgorod | 41 14 4 | 59 36 24 | 60
samara | 22 10 5 | 37 28 9 | 37
ekaterinburg | 35 11 2 | 48 26 20 | 46
perm | 19 14 4 | 37 32 9 | 41
novosibirsk | 24 12 4 | 40 23 15 | 38
krasnoyarsk | 30 4 2 | 36 24 10 | 34
volgograd | 4 5 2 | 11 7 4 | 11
chelyabinsk | 9 5 3 | 17 11 7 | 18
omsk | 6 5 1 | 12 9 2 | 11
Total | 258 113 40 | 411 262 152 | 414
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 4.5 Sectoral Distribution of Firms by Competition Level 
2-digit | domestic comp 1=hi 2=med 3=lo import comp. 1=yes
industry | (if sal>50%ru/obt) 0=no
code | 1 2 3 | Total 0 1 | Total
Chemical and oil-chemical| 30 16 4 | 50 29 26 | 55
Mach. Buil./Metal working| 45 42 19 | 106 70 29 | 99
Wood and paper | 43 5 5 | 53 43 19 | 62
Stone and clay | 37 26 7 | 70 55 11 | 66
Light industry | 48 18 3 | 69 23 49 | 72
Food industry | 55 6 2 | 63 42 18 | 60
Total | 258 113 40 | 411 262 152 | 414
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 4.6 Size Distribution of Firms by Competition LevelWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  39 
 
 Time var.            |  domestic comp 1=hi 2=med 3=lo  import comp. 1=yes
employment | (if sal>50%ru/obt) 0=no
size | 1 2 3 | Total 0 1 | Total
< 500 | 103 26 10 | 139 88 49 | 137
501 - 1000 | 73 45 14 | 132 83 49 | 132
> 1000 | 68 35 14 | 117 73 48 | 121
Total | 244 106 38 | 388 244 146 | 390
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 4.7 Ownership, Distribution of Firms by Competition Level
| domestic comp 1=hi 2=med 3=lo import comp. 1=yes
| (if sal>50%ru/obt) 0=no
sopo | 1 2 3 | Total 0 1 | Total
State owned | 8 2 1 | 11 10 3 | 13
Private owned | 205 92 33 | 330 207 124 | 331
Total | 215 94 34 | 343 217 129 | 346
Source: Authors’ calculations 
There is little relationship between the firm's main sector of activity, at the two-digit level, and 
perceived domestic competition, though this is not true for import competition.  Thus from table 
4.5 we can observe that around 10 percent of firms in every two-digit sector indicate low levels 
of domestic competition, except for the machine building and metal working sector where the 
proportion is closer to 20 percent.  However more firms than average in the wood and paper and 
the food industries report themselves subject to high domestic competition.  In contrast, 
significant import competition is relatively lower in these sectors (Stone & Clay and Food), but 
much higher than average in Light industry and for firms in the Chemical sector. 
 
Interestingly, there is little relationship between perceived market power — domestic or against 
importers — and enterprise size.  This is consistent with the view that perceptions of competition 
by managers relate to the very specific markets upon which their companies operate, ranging 
from niche activities for small enterprises to broadly defined markets for much larger ones.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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However, it is reassuring to note from table 4.6 that, though the differences are slight among 
larger firms (>1000 employees), there is a relatively higher proportion of enterprises facing low 
domestic competition and no import competition, while the converse is true for the smallest firm 
category (<500 workers). 
 
Finally we turn to ownership distribution.  It has been argued that the state will sell ‘the best 
firms’ first, which may imply that it would privatise the enterprises with more market power, 
domestic or international (see Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2000), Walsh and Whelan (2000)).  Our 
sample contains relatively few state owned firms (around 4 percent) but it can be seen in table 
4.7 that this small group contains almost no firms in the low competitive category.  This is 
consistent with the view that the state did privatise firms with significant domestic monopoly 
power, though import competition does not appear to have entered the calculations.    
 
4.4 Effects of Competition  
Competition is likely to affect performance through changes in (1) restructuring and innovation; 
(2) efficiency and productivity; (3) profitability. Though arbitrary (because of clear overlapping 
and interconnections) we can use the above division into three groups to explore the effect of 
competition on Russian firms using a series of key variables.  Commencing with restructuring, 
we will look at magnitude and consistency of a series of reforms undertaken between 1997 and 
1999; at the likelihood of having recently made a major investment in fixed capital; and at the 
vintage of capital. As regards productivity and efficiency, the indices used are labour 
productivity; value added per worker and proportion of equipment utilisation. Finally, ROE, 
EBITD over sales and EBITD over fixed assets
17 are the profitability measures employed. Again, 
levels and rates of change will be looked at. 
 
4.4.1 Restructuring and Innovation  
The questionnaire reports information on fifteen possible reforms, asking whether they have 
been implemented between 1997 and 1999, and, if not, exploring some possible reasons for it.  
 
In order to obtain synthetic measures, they have been grouped into: 
                                                 
17 Return on equity is defined as 1999 after-tax profits (losses) divided by capital and reserves. EBITD is pre-tax 
profits (losses).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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•   Type of restructuring: pro-active versus defensive reforms. 
•   Intensity of restructuring: 
-  continuous, if the firm has restructured constantly between 1997 and 1999 
-  one-off, for firms which have undertaken the various reforms once between 1997 and 
1999 
-  missed, if reforms were needed but could not be implemented 
The indices range between zero and one. Hence, a firm that has undertaken all the pro-active 
reforms every year between 1997 and 1999 will have the maximum score of one in its “pro-
active, continuous” index, and so on.  
 
Table 4.8 Restructuring Indices and Competition  
  Domestic competition  Foreign competition 
 
 High  Medium  Low  Yes  no 
Pro-active, continuous  .363 
(.319) 
.382 
(.329) 
.286 
(.309) 
.402 
(.318) 
.341 
(.324) 
Pro-active, one off  .630 
(.285) 
.635 
(.289) 
.564 
(.321) 
No difference 
Pro-active, missed  No difference (overall mean = .160) 
Defensive, continuous  .244 
(.264) 
.220 
(.251) 
.190 
(.207) 
.247 
(.263) 
.230 
(.256) 
Defensive, one off  .488 
(.306) 
.519 
(.287) 
.460 
(.275) 
.518 
(.308) 
.482 
(.291) 
Defensive, missed  .032 
(.089) 
.040 
(.089) 
.040 
(.092) 
No difference 
(overall mean = .037) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
  Group-specific mean values are reported only when the differences are significant 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The use of more than one measure is advisable because none of them is devoid of ambiguity. 
Continuous restructuring might be seen both as a sign of “virtuous behaviour” and a failure to 
succeed at the first time. Exactly the opposite can be said of the one-off index. The third 
indicator, instead, might be biased because the incentive not to admit the failure to implement 
necessary reforms (and to provide wrong information instead) is quite high. Thus this latter William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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measure might simply be a sub-sample of a larger group of firms, whose interviewees refused to 
answer or gave misleading responses
18.  
 
First of all, the data suggest that firms engage more in deep rather than defensive reforms. As far 
as the latter is concerned, companies have undertaken less than half of the 5 reforms they were 
asked about, and less than a quarter of them continuously. The equivalent values for pro-active 
reforms are all significantly higher. Firms have undertaken 60 percent of them at least once 
between 1997 and 1999, of which more than one half continuously. This first result is indicative 
of some widespread attempt to pursue structural changes. 
 
At a more detailed level, there is evidence of a positive association of pro-active restructuring 
with competition, both domestic and foreign. Firms in highly and medium competitive domestic 
markets restructure more than those in concentrated environments, both intermittently and 
continuously. The same applies to firms facing import competition. No significant differences, 
instead, have been detected in the last category. 
 
Such results are consistent with the hypothesis that competition is positive for firms, as it forces 
them to be more “virtuous”. However, the magnitude of the differentials for companies in low 
and highly competitive environments is not very large.  
 
As far as defensive reforms are concerned, it is theoretically unclear whether higher restructuring 
in more competitive environments is seen as a failure (because of the necessity of recurring to 
emergency measures, so to speak) or as a success (because firms are responsive to signals from 
the market).  
 
The data are not clear, either. As regards domestic competition, high-competition firms have 
more continuous and less one-off restructuring than medium-competition ones (moreover, the 
significance level is very low). The latter group has undertaken more one-off restructuring than 
firms in very concentrated markets. Lastly, firms in highly competitive markets have a lower 
                                                 
18 Alternatives that could be chosen by respondents are: reforms were not implemented because there was no need 
to; reform undertaken before 1997; difficult to answer. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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proportion of necessary but not undertaken reforms than the other two groups. Firms subject to 
foreign competition restructure more.  
 
The small size of mean differentials between competition groups renders further exploration 
necessary. Such results might in fact be driven purely by some spurious correlation. Controlling 
for ownership, size, location and ownership structure of the company provides stronger evidence 
of the existence of a “true” competition effect of restructuring (although the use of regression 
analysis introduces the further issue of potential endogeneity between the two, which is not 
addressed here). Moreover, allowing for interactions between state shares and competition 
dummies will provide some initial evidence of the existence of complementarity or 
substitutability between privatisation and competition, shedding light on the different objectives 
and behaviour of state-owned and privately-owned firms. 
 
Table 4.9 Competition and Restructuring — Regression Analysis — Significant 
Coefficients 
  Deep restructuring  Defensive restructuring 
  C C+I  OF  OF+I  M  M+I C C+I  OF  OF+I  M  M+I 
State              +  
Med dom       +  +  -  -    +  + 
Lo dom  -  -  -  -   -  -     
Foreign              
Med*state     -    +         
Lo* state              
For* state     -   +      +    
Note:   C = continuous restructuring 
  OF = one-off restructuring 
  M = missed restructuring 
  I = interactions 
  The significance is up to the 90% level 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 4.9 shows clearly that the previous results are not due to hidden spurious correlation (at 
least not with the regressors included in the OLS). Domestic competition is the true driving 
force, while foreign one is a less significant factor. Firms in highly concentrated markets engage 
in less deep restructuring (both continuous and one-off) than highly competitive ones, and to 
some extent in defensive restructuring as well, together with medium competition enterprises. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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This latter group has more missed reforms. Defensive restructuring is positively correlated with 
state shares. Some significant interaction of ownership with competition occurs, but there is 
never any difference in sign between state and private share ownership. 
 
An indirect way to look at the state of restructuring in a firm is to check the proportion of capital 
by age category, and control for evidence of a relationship between the undertaking of major 
investments in fixed capital and the level of competition faced by the firm.  
 
If competition shortens the innovation cycle, the lower the concentration, the higher the 
probability of having recently (since August 1998) undertaken a major investment.  A binary 
variable coded one if such case is observed is regressed on competition level, controlling for 
size, industry, location and ownership structure of firms. Ceteris paribus, firms facing foreign 
competition are more likely to have undertaken the investment. Moreover, the interaction of 
import competition dummies with the shares owned by the government shows that such 
likelihood is higher the larger the privately owned share. Vice versa, within firms subject to 
import competition, the higher the proportion owned by the state, the lower the probability of 
having undertaken the investment. This result is quite interesting, as it supports the view that 
competition affects firms differently according to their ownership structure. Table 4.10 illustrates 
the main results. 
 
A further indirect measure of restructuring is the age of firm’s equipment. The proportion of 
capital less than 10 years old is regressed on ownership and competition, controlling for size, 
location and industry. Although some weak negative association between state-owned shares and 
proportion of “new” equipment is detected (higher state-owned shares correlated with lower 
proportion of “new” machinery), no competition effect is found.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 4.10 Logistic Regressions of Probability of Undertaking Major Investment in 
Fixed Capital Since August 1998 
Probability of undertaking 
investment 
Basic model  Interactions 
Controls for:     
Size  Some effect  Some effect 
Region  Not significant   Not significant  
Industry  Some effect  Some effect 
State ownership  -   (p-value=0.111)  No significant  
Domestic competition:     
Medium  Not significant   Not significant  
Low  Not significant   Not significant  
Foreign competition:     
Yes  .549  (p-value=0.065)  .745  (p-value=0.022) 
Interaction of state ownership and 
foreign competition 
---  -.042   (p-value=0.097) 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4.4.2 Efficiency and Productivity 
Competition and the hardening of budget constraints might be associated with increased 
efficiency.  The proportion of fixed capital used by the enterprise, in levels and first difference, 
may be an indicator of its efficiency, both in a static and dynamic context. Both measures are 
regressed on ownership and competition, allowing for interactions between the two, with the 
usual controls. The same specifications are adopted for the productivity measures used, sales per 
worker and value added. Region, industry, size and ownership effects are detected (ownership is 
significant only vis a vis the growth of capital utilisation: the higher the state shares, the lower 
the change in the proportion of capital used), but no competition-specific result is found. 
Although no major significant effects are detected, a few interesting points can still be made.  
 
As far as capital utilisation is concerned, notice how the dynamic specification performs better 
than the static one. Moreover, the competition variables, both alone and interacted with 
ownership, have contrasting effects in the levels and growth equations. To look at the dynamics 
is potentially quite an interesting exercise. Firms hit by competition may face different initial William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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conditions. In this case, it is the variables’ changes, and not only their initial levels, which will be 
affected. 
 
Table 4.11 Competition, Efficiency and Productivity 
EFFICIENCY   Basic 
equation 
Interactions Exceptions 
Levels ---  Capital utilisation 
First 
difference 
 
Competition not statistically 
significant 
--- 
PRODUCTIVITY   Basic 
equation 
Interactions Exceptions 
Levels ---  Log-Value added 
per worker  First 
difference 
--- 
Levels Low  comp.  –ve coeff. (p-value=.151)  Labour productivity 
First 
difference 
 
Competition not statistically 
significant 
--- 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
As regards productivity instead, no major consistent pattern of differences between the statics 
and dynamics can be detected. Both in the labour productivity and value added regressions, the 
signs (but not the significance) of the coefficients suggest that enterprises facing higher 
competition, both foreign and domestic, have also greater productivity levels. Overall, this may 
suggest the existence of some relationship between competition and the pursuit of higher 
efficiency. 
 
4.4.3 Profitability 
We have so far observed that competition is positively associated with restructuring. Although 
such effect is not captured by variation in the proportion of capital utilisation, and no major 
significant differences are detected in the comparison of productivity levels for enterprises facing 
varying degrees of competition, a successful restructuring is expected to increase productivity 
and to have an indirect impact on profitability.  On the other hand, competition per se is likely to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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reduce profit margins (through a decrease in demand and a reduction in firm-specific rents). 
Hence, the total (direct plus indirect) effect of competition on profitability cannot easily be 
predicted a priori.  
 
A series of regressions have been performed in order to check for some association between 
competition and profitability indicators. As usual, size, region, industry and ownership have been 
controlled for. Moreover, competition dummies have been interacted with shares of state 
ownership. The dependent variables have been used in both levels and rates of change, in order 
to capture both dynamic and static effects. A synthetic table with the essential information is 
reported here.  
 
Apart from a few sporadic results, with a very weak significance level overall it appears that 
competition plays no direct role in the level and growth of profitability. Medium domestic 
competition is associated with faster growth of the profit-capital ratio (base category is high 
competition). Moreover, the same firms’ ROE is higher the lower the state shares. Finally, low 
competition firms‘ growth of profit/sales is lower the higher the proportion of shares held by the 
state.  
Table 4.12 Competition, Profitability and Productivity 
PROFITABILITY   Basic 
equation 
Interactions Exceptions 
Levels (Medium  comp*state  sh.)  –ve coeff. 
(p-value=.104) 
ROE 
First difference  --- 
Levels ---  Profit/capital  
(low F statistics)  First difference  Medium  comp.  +ve coeff. (p-
value=.102) 
Levels --- 
First  difference  (Low comp*state sh.) –ve coeff. (p-
value=.106) 
Profit/sales 
 
 
 
Competition not 
statistically significant 
 
Note:    OLS regressions of the indicator on ownership and domestic and foreign competition, plus 
interactions, controlling for size, location and industry.  
In the value added case, a log-linearised Cobb-Douglas production function with the above controls 
and ownership and competition effects is estimated. 
Omitted category: PO shares; High domestic competition; no foreign competition. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Results for the EBITD/capital ratio come from too poor a specification to have any relevance. 
Comparisons of the overall significance of ownership and competition variables in the remaining 
two indices shows no consistency. However, from the scarce significant coefficients we can 
observe that the levels and growth of medium and low competition companies is lower 
(compared to high competition ones) the higher the proportion of shares owned by the 
government. This partial result is in line with the findings of the previous sections, and it 
somehow confirms the importance of the interplay between ownership and competition. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
Overall, our findings are quite interesting. The major effect of competition is undoubtedly on the 
intensity and the type of restructuring. Low domestic competition is associated with less pro-
active reforms, and medium competition with more missed ones. State shareholding is associated 
with higher levels of defensive restructuring. Competition is a driving force in terms of capital 
investment, too, although on this occasion it is foreign competition that has the major impact.  
 
Altogether, these results suggest that the likely impact of competition on firm behaviour is 
consistent with the notion of an increase in effort levels, and the pursuit of efficiency to counter 
the decrease in rents. However, using direct measurements of efficiency indicators (vintage of 
capital and two different measures of productivity) do not provide additional compelling 
evidence. Though the signs of the competition variables are consistent with this scenario- high 
productivity being generally associated with high competition (also a weakly significant negative 
effect of low domestic competition on the level of labour productivity).   The productivity effect 
of competition is varied and overall too unclear to be conclusive though again the few (weakly) 
significant variables are not inconsistent with arguments of positive efficiency effects.   
 
The really interesting findings, however, are the least explored in the present analysis. Two 
points repeatedly emerge from our research. One is the importance of the impact of competition 
as a dynamic phenomenon, an issue that clearly deserves much more careful consideration and 
modelling at the theoretical level. This is shown not only by the signs of the coefficients in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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various first difference regressions, but primarily by the link between competition and 
restructuring, this latter one being itself a dynamic process, rather than a static concept. 
 
The other is the importance of the interplay between corporate governance and competition. 
Overall, our investigation suggests that the positive effect of the latter on performance is not a 
substitute, but a complement to privatisation. More generally, it indicate how ownership affects 
firm behaviour and objectives, and enterprise responses to the same exogenous shocks. 
 
5.  Performance, Restructuring and Finance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The importance of finance for corporate restructuring and performance is one of the most 
consistent conclusions throughout studies of transition. While privatisation has led to the transfer 
of ownership from state to private hands, investment in physical capital is fundamental if 
enterprises are to restructure in a manner that will enable their long-term viability. Unfortunately 
available evidence suggests that enterprises in transition economies have been subjected to acute 
financial constraints that have hindered the restructuring process (see e.g., Cornelli, Portes and 
Schaffer (1996), Commander, Fan and Schaffer (1996), Bevan, Estrin and Schaffer (1999)).  
 
While the financial markets of the transition front-runners have begun to approach those of 
middle income countries, those in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) generally remain thin and do 
not constitute an ‘enabling environment’. Although the financial environment in Russia may be 
somewhat more developed than in many of the satellite states, it has been severely weakened by 
the August 1998 crisis. This has led to a demonetisation of the economy and the emergence of 
barter — a phenomenon that has been largely confined to the FSU (see Commander and 
Mumssen (1999)).  
 
This section considers the results of our survey that relate finance, restructuring and 
performance. We firstly consider the extent to which enterprises are financially constrained and 
the forms in which these constraints manifest themselves. Sub-section 3 provides more detail by 
considering the extent to which financial constraints differ according to characteristics of the 
enterprise such as size, region, area of activity and so on. In order to ease the analysis we then William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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combine the individual constraints to construct an overall credit constraint, and examine the 
variation of this constraint across units of observation. Sub-section 4 considers the consequences 
of aggregate financial constraint in terms of the impact on barter, restructuring and investment 
activity. The section continues to examine the influence that these factors have over company 
performance in our sample. Sub-section 5 summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
5.2. Are Companies Financially Constrained and How? 
The prevailing conditions in Russia suggest that while commercial credit may be difficult to 
obtain generally, the majority of lending that does occur is short term in nature —  hence more 
suitable for working capital than longer-term investment projects. This is borne out by the results 
presented in table 5.1 below. Only 9.4 percent of firms surveyed report that they would find it 
impossible to obtain short-term commercial bank credit, compared to 23.3 percent who report 
that they would find it impossible to obtain long-term finance. Moreover while 55.1 percent of 
our firms report that they would find it very easy or fairly easy to obtain a short-term commercial 
bank lending, a mere 21.9 percent find it equally easy to obtain long-term bank finance. 
Nonetheless, short-term commercial credit does not appear to be prohibitively expensive at the 
aggregate, with the mean interest rate payable on a short-term loan being 34.7 percent.  
 
Table 5.1 Availability of credit on commercial terms (%) 
  Short-term bank credit  Long-term bank credit 
 
Very easy  16.7  6.1 
Fairly easy  38.4  15.8 
Fairly difficult  23.3  28.4 
Very difficult  8.9  21.1 
Impossible 9.4  23.3 
Difficult to answer  2.8  4.8 
Refuse to answer  0.5  0.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 5.2 reinforces the distinction between short and long-term finance, and reveals more detail 
of the term structure of finance. A striking 57.7 percent of firms report that they would be unable William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
  51 
 
to obtain commercial credit for more than 12 months duration, with only 20.8 percent claiming 
that they would have access to commercial credit repayable in more than 12 months and only 4.8 
percent more than five years
19.  
 
Table 5.2 The longest period any bank would be willing to lend to you (%) 
 
Less than one month 
 
0.7 
1-3 months  13.5 
4-6 months  18.3 
7-12 months  25.2 
1-2 years  10.3 
3-5 years  5.7 
Greater than 5 years  4.8 
Impossible to get credit on 
commercial terms 
11.4 
Difficult to answer  9.6 
Refuse to answer  0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Unsurprisingly our results suggest that companies find it even more difficult to obtain equity 
financing. Table 5.3 reports that 29.8 percent of our sample report that they would find it 
impossible to obtain equity financing from Russian external investors, and 45.1 percent claim 
that it would be fairly or very difficult. Evidence suggests that firms find it even more difficult to 
obtain non-Russian equity financing — 46.1 percent report it impossible to obtain equity 
financing from foreign sources and 30.3 percent claim that this would be fairly or very difficult. 
 
                                                 
19 We note that there is some inconsistency between the answers to the questions in the two tables, as fifty of our 
surveyed firms report that they would find it impossible to obtain any commercial credit in table 5.2, while only 
forty firms reported that they would find it impossible to obtain both short and long-term finance in table 5.1. 
Moreover we are aware of the fuzzy nature of the distinction between long and short-term finance differ; one firm 
stated that it would find it impossible to obtain short-term finance, fairly difficult but not impossible to obtain long-
term finance and that the maximum term over which it could obtain a bank loan was 4-6 months.  Furthermore it is 
probable that the reported mean interest rate payable is biased downwards due to the unobservable nature of 
punitively high interest rates which are censored from the distribution as equilbrium rather than supply reates are 
observed. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 5.3 Availability of equity financing 
  Russian investors  Foreign investors 
 
Very easy  1.2  0.9 
Fairly easy  9.1  4.8 
Fairly difficult  16.2  9.1 
Very difficult  28.9  21.2 
Impossible 29.8  46.1 
Difficult to answer  12.6  16.0 
Refuse to answer  2.2  1.9 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Finally we consider whether companies may find it easier to obtain financial assistance from the 
state. On the surface it appears that this is most certainly not the case, as a resounding 84.4 
percent of firms state that they would find it very difficult or impossible to obtain financial 
assistance from the federal budget. It would appear that it is slightly easier to obtain regional 
state assistance, as only 59.9 percent of firms report the same at the regional level. However, 
despite this apparent difficulty of obtaining state assistance, our results suggest that a substantial 
number of firms are successful. Table 5.4 below presents the results of three constructed 
variables indicating whether a firm received federal, regional and federal and/or regional 
assistance. The first two variables are constructed to take a value of one if a firm received any 
form of federal assistance and regional assistance respectively and zero otherwise; the third 
variable is then assigned a value of one if a firm received a value of one for either or both the 
federal and regional variables.  
 
Table 5.4 Receipt of federal, regional and federal and/or regional assistance 
  Federal  Regional  Either or both 
 
Received 31.8  38.8  53.1 
Did not receive  68.2  61.2  46.9 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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As table 5.4 illustrates 31.8 percent of firms received some form of federal state assistance in our 
sample. The table also illustrates a slight bias towards regional assistance as 38.8 percent of 
firms reported receiving some form of regional state assistance. Overall, more than half of our 
sample (53.1 percent) received either or both forms of assistance, with 26.9 percent of these 
firms receiving only federal assistance, 40.1 percent receiving only regional assistance and 33 
percent receiving both. 
 
Of the individual sources of state assistance, the overriding number of cases report assistance 
through regional tax holidays or restructuring of federal and regional tax debt — 82 of our 437 
firms report that they have obtained regional tax holidays, and 88 (69) firms report restructuring 
of their federal (regional) tax debts. 
 
5.3 How Do These Constraints Differ Across Units of Observation? 
5.3.1. Commercial Credit 
The are many reasons to consider that the degree to which firms are financially constrained may 
differ as a result of company size. Studies of corporate financial structure have tended to find 
that, controlling for additional factors, corporate leverage increases with company size, perhaps 
as a result of improved access to commercial credit resulting from the fact that the probability of 
bankruptcy is diminishing with size  (see e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995), Cornelli, Portes and 
Schaffer (1996), Bevan and Danbolt (2001)). Similarly one may hypothesise that larger firms are 
more likely to have access to equity finance. These assumptions are, however, questionable in an 
economy such as the FSU; there is a significant probability that very large firms are monoliths 
that have undertaken limited reform. Hence we may hypothesise that larger firms are likely to 
receive better access to state assistance, perhaps because they are more significant with relation 
to the economy, have better lobbying skills and so on. In this event, if credit markets operate 
rationally larger firms would be expected to receive less bank and equity finance.  
 
We find some variation across our three size classes regarding the maximum term over which 
they would expect to be afforded a commercial bank loan. The number of firms reporting that 
they would find it impossible to obtain any commercial credit diminishes with size (15 percent of 
our sample of small firms, against 10.1 percent of medium-sized firms and 8 percent of large 
firms). Among firms that are able to receive commercial bank debt, we find more variation William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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among short-term (defined as less than one year) than long-term debt (one to five years) — 50.3 
percent of small firms state that the maximum term over which they get credit would 12 months 
or less, compared to 60.4 percent of medium-sized firms and 63.2 percent of large firms. We do 
not find similar variation in terms of credit of one to five years duration, perhaps due to the fact 
that long-term credit is less available generally. 
 
Figure 5.1 below cross-cuts the response to the question ‘How easy would it be for your 
enterprise to obtain a short term bank loan on commercial terms’ with size.  
Small firms (n=147, 8 non-responses)
 Very easy
17%
Fairly easy
32% Fairly difficult
24%
Very difficult
10%
Impossible
17%
Medium firms (n=139, 4 non-responses)
Fairly easy
41%
Fairly difficult
30%
Very difficult
10%
Impossible
7%  Very easy
12%
Large firms (n=125, 2 non-responses)
Very difficult
8%
Fairly difficult
18%
Impossible
4%
Fairly easy
46%
 Very easy
24%
Figure 5.1 - Availability of short term credit by firm size class  
We find the percentage of firms reporting that they would find it impossible to obtain short-term 
credit access is diminishing in size: 17 percent of our small firms, relative to 7 percent of our 
medium-sized firms and 4 percent of our large firms. Similarly we find 49 percent of small firms 
report that it would be very easy or fairly easy to obtain short-term commercial credit, compared 
to 53 percent of medium-sized firms and 70 percent of large firms. We do not find a similar 
variation in long-term credit access, confirming our prior result. 
 
We also find a strong regional dimension to commercial credit access. While 11.4 percent of all 
firms report that they would be unable to obtain any commercial credit, several regions report 
lower percentages: Moscow city or region, where no firms report this to be the case, 6.7 percent 
(10 percent) of firms in St Petersburg region (city), 7.7 percent in Samara and no firms in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Volgograd (although our sample in Volgograd is smaller than the others, with only 10 firms 
responding to the question).  
 
Once again, however, there are variations between short and long-term credit. Table 5.5 
illustrates that of the 57 percent of firms claiming that they would find it very easy or fairly easy 
to obtain short-term commercial credit, considerably more firms thought so in Moscow city, St 
Petersburg city, Nizhny Novgorod, Ekaterinburg and Samara. The lowest figures were found in 
Krasnoyarsk and Omsk, although the latter figure is likely to be biased owing to the small 
sample size in Omsk.  
Table 5.5 Availability of short-term credit 
  Very Easy or  
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Moscow 73.5  0.0  34 
Moscow region  58.5  4.9  41 
St. Petersburg  72.4  6.9  29 
St. Petersburg region  53.3  20.0  15 
Nizhny Novgorod  69.8  7.9  63 
Samara 62.2  8.1  37 
Ekaterinburg 67.3  4.1  49 
Perm 51.2  22.0  41 
Novosibirsk 38.5  15.4  39 
Krasnoyarsk 36.1  13.9  36 
Volgograd 54.5  0.0  11 
Chelyabinsk 41.2  5.9  17 
Omsk 9.1  27.3  11 
Average 57.0  9.7  423 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
While long-term credit is generally less available, and hence the number of positive responses 
are smaller, table 5.6 illustrates that access appears to be easier in Chelyabinsk (although again 
the sample size is small) and St Petersburg city (which have the highest percentage of firms 
reporting very easy or fairly easy). By contrast access appears to be most difficult in Perm and 
Omsk . 
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Table 5.6 Availability of long-term credit 
  Very Easy or  
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Moscow 34.4  12.5  32 
Moscow region  17.1  34.1  41 
St. Petersburg  50.0  10.7  28 
St. Petersburg region  35.7  28.6  14 
Nizhny Novgorod  25.8  22.6  62 
Samara 27.0  18.9  37 
Ekaterinburg 25.0  20.8  48 
Perm 10.3  38.5  39 
Novosibirsk 45.9  0.0  37 
Krasnoyarsk 14.3  28.6  35 
Volgograd 25.0  16.7  12 
Chelyabinsk 61.1  0.0  18 
Omsk 0.0  54.5  11 
Average 27.8  21.5  414 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Interestingly we also find that the interest rate that firms would expect to pay on a short-term 
loan varies considerably by region. Firms in Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk report higher mean 
expected interest rates than the average (38.45 and 38.3 and percent respectively, against an 
average of 34.68 percent). Perhaps unsurprisingly the lowest expected interest rates are reported 
by firms in St Petersburg and Moscow cities (30.31 and 31.74 percent respectively). 
 
We also find evidence of an important industrial dimension in responses to questions concerning 
commercial credit availability. The results presented in table 5.7 illustrate that considerably 
fewer firms than average expected to find it impossible to obtain short-term bank credit in the 
chemicals sector , and considerably more felt so in the wood and paper, and building materials 
sectors. Similarly more firms in the chemicals sector and the food industry felt that it would be 
very easy or fairly easy to obtain short-term bank debt — most likely because these sectors have 
had the most robust demand and attracted a large share of foreign direct investment. Far fewer William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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firms considered this to be the case in the building materials and light industry sectors, which 
largely supply the domestic market and have attracted limited foreign interest. 
 
Table 5.7 Availability of short-term credit 
  Very  Easy or  
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Chemicals 70.2  1.8  57 
Machinery 55.8  10.6  104 
Wood and paper  55.6  14.3  63 
Building materials  44.9  13.0  69 
Light industry  49.3  8.7  69 
Food industry  70.5  8.2  61 
Average 57.0  9.7  423 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Once again, there is less variation with respect to long-term credit, although it is notable that a 
very low number (9.5 percent) of firms in the food industry expected it to be impossible to obtain 
long-term credit. Consequently we find little variation between industries in terms of the 
proportion of firms claiming that they would be able to obtain lending for 12 months or less. As 
table 5.8 illustrates, the variation occurs in the proportion of firms claiming that it would be 
impossible to obtain any commercial credit. As expected on the basis of previous results, the 
building materials sector reports by far the largest percentage of ‘impossibles’, closely followed 
by the machinery and the wood and paper sectors. 
 
Table 5.8 Longest period that a bank would be willing to lend to you 
  12 months or less 
(%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Chemicals 58.2  5.5  55 
Machinery 66.7  15.6  90 
Wood and paper  65.6  14.8  61 
Building materials  61.5  18.5  65 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Light industry  70.8  12.3  65 
Food industry  59.6  7.0  57 
Average 64.1  12.7  393 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Overall therefore, our results suggest that access to and the cost of commercial credit will be 
related to: 
 
•   Size larger firms report it easier to obtain short-term commercial credit, there is 
no size variation in long-term credit; 
•   Region    easier to obtain short-term credit in Moscow, St Petersburg, 
Nizhny Novgorod, Ekaterinburg  and Samara; long-term in Chelyabinsk and St 
Petersburg city; higher interest rates charged in Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk, 
lower in St Petersburg and Moscow cities; 
•        Industry most difficult access appears to be in building materials, machinery, 
and wood and paper sectors. 
 
5.3.2. Equity Financing 
Unsurprisingly we find that the ease of obtaining equity finance differs significantly according to 
the size of the firm in our sample. Figure 5.2 below presents the responses to the question ‘How 
easy would you find it to obtain equity financing from Russian external investors’. We find that 
the percentage of firms that report that they would find it very easy or fairly easy increases with 
the size of the firm — 8 percent of small firms against 13 percent of medium-sized firms against 
18 percent of large firms.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Small firms (n=135, 18 non-responses)
Imposs ible
38%
Very difficult
38%
 Very easy
1% Fairly easy
7%
Fairly difficult
16%
Medium firms (n=137, 16 non-responses)
Very difficult
34%
Imposs ible
31%
Fairly easy
11%
Fairly difficult
22%
 Very easy
2%
Large firms (n=122, 17 non-responses)
Very difficult
30%
Impossible
34%
Fairly difficult
18%
Fairly easy
16%
 Very easy
2%
Figure 5.2 - Access to Russian equity finance by firm size class  
The picture is less clear however when considering the number of firms reporting that it would 
be impossible to obtain Russian equity financing: although a smaller percentage of medium and 
large firms claim that this would be impossible, slightly less medium-sized firms report so than 
larger firms. By contrast, the results of the same question with respect to external equity are more 
clear-cut as illustrated in figure 5.3 below.  
Small firms (n=135, 21 non-responses)
I mpossible
65%
Fairly difficult
6%
Fairly easy
4%
 Very easy
0%
Very difficult
25%
Medium firms (n=137, 24 non-responses)
I mpossible
52%
Fairly easy
7%
Very difficult
29%
Fairly difficult
11%
 Very easy
1%
Large firms (n=122, 19 non-responses)
Impossible
49%
Fairly easy
7%
Fairly difficult
17%
Very difficult
24%
 Very easy
3%
Figure 5.3 - Access to foreign equity finance by firm size class
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We note that whilst firms generally report that they would find it more difficult to obtain foreign 
than Russian equity, there is also a clear size dimension present in the access to foreign equity 
finance. A greater proportion of firms report that obtaining foreign equity would be very easy or 
fairly easy as size increases, reinforced by a monotonic decline in the percentage of firms 
reporting that this would be impossible (and impossible or fairly difficult). 
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the regional dimension of Russian and Foreign equity financing, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.9 Ease of obtaining Russian investors for equity financing 
  Very Easy or 
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Moscow 15.6  34.4  32 
Moscow region  10.0  50.0  40 
St. Petersburg  18.2  18.2  22 
St. Petersburg region  16.7  50.0  12 
Nizhny Novgorod  15.2  23.9  46 
Samara 13.3  30.0  30 
Ekaterinburg 11.9  38.1  42 
Perm 6.5  41.9  31 
Novosibirsk 11.8  23.5  34 
Krasnoyarsk 8.8  41.2  34 
Volgograd 14.3  28.6  7 
Chelyabinsk 13.3  33.3  15 
Omsk 0.0  50.0  12 
Average  12.0  35.0  357 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 5.9 illustrates that more firms regarded it as very easy or fairly easy to obtain Russian 
equity in St. Petersburg city, St Petersburg oblast (although this figure is potentially biased by 
the low number of responses) Moscow city and Nizhny Novgorod. By contrast a surprising 50 
percent of firms in Moscow and St Petersburg oblasts report that they would find it impossible to 
obtain Russian equity, followed by 41.9 percent of firms in Perm and 41.2 percent in 
Krasnoyarsk. Table 5.10 provides further evidence that sourcing foreign equity finance is more William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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difficult that Russian equity finance, with the number of firms reporting ‘impossible’ increasing 
in all regions. Nonetheless, St Petersburg city has by far the smallest number of impossibles, and 
largest percentage of firms reporting very or fairly easy, followed by Nizhny Novgorod and 
Krasnoyarsk. 
 
Table 5.10 Ease of obtaining foreign investors for equity financing 
  Very Easy or 
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Moscow 3.0  54.5  33 
Moscow region  5.3  60.5  38 
St. Petersburg  22.7  27.3  22 
St. Petersburg region  0.0  72.7  11 
Nizhny Novgorod  11.6  60.5  43 
Samara 6.5  58.1  31 
Ekaterinburg 7.9  57.9  38 
Perm 0.0  58.6  29 
Novosibirsk 5.9  44.1  34 
Krasnoyarsk 12.5  56.3  32 
Volgograd 0.0  40.0  5 
Chelyabinsk 0.0  75.0  16 
Omsk 0.0  66.7  12 
Average 7.0  56.1  344 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
At the 2 digit industry level, the results of table 5.11 illustrate that the food industry contains by 
far the largest proportion of firms reporting that they would find it very or fairly easy to 
obtaining Russian equity financing. The food sector also reports the second lowest number of 
impossibles, closely following the machinery sector. As table 5.12 illustrates the food industry 
also appears to be the least constrained sector in terms of foreign equity, with the chemicals 
industry following at a distance. This result is not entirely surprising as the food industry in most 
transition countries has typically benefited from more robust demand. Moreover returns to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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investment have been high due to the nature of the food sector under central planning, and hence 
the sector has typically been able to attract significant investment (both domestic and foreign). 
 
Table 5.11 Ease of obtaining Russian investors for equity financing 
  Very Easy or 
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Chemicals 12.8  34.0  47 
Machinery 12.6  31.0  87 
Wood and paper  7.5  39.6  53 
Building materials  5.1  35.6  59 
Light industry  5.2  43.1  58 
Food industry  33.3  31.3  48 
Average 12.2  35.5  352 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 5.12 Ease of obtaining foreign investors for equity financing 
  Very Easy or 
Fairly Easy (%) 
 
Impossible (%)  No. obs 
Chemicals 10.9  50.0  46 
Machinery 6.0  54.2  83 
Wood and paper  1.9  62.3  53 
Building materials  3.3  62.3  61 
Light industry  1.9  59.3  54 
Food industry  21.3  46.8  47 
Average 7.0  56.1  344 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
5.3.3. State Assistance 
Perhaps surprisingly our results suggest that, in our sample, the likelihood of receiving state 
assistance does not vary greatly according to company size. The results in figures 5.4 and 5.5 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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show that medium-sized firms are slightly more likely to obtain either federal or regional state 
assistance, although we do observe that the level of difficulty expected in obtaining federal 
assistance is consistently greater than that for regional state assistance.  
Small firms (n=147, 4 non-responses)
Impossible
71%
Fairly difficult
8%
Very difficult
20%
 Very easy
0%
Fairly easy
1%
Medium firms (n=137, 4 non-responses)
Impossible
52%
Fairly easy
1%  Very easy
0% Fairly difficult
17%
Very di ffi cul t
30%
Large firms (n=125, 4 non-responses)
Impossible
67%
Fairly difficult
7%
Very di ffi cul t
23%
 Very easy
0%
Fairly easy
3%
Figure 5.4 - Ease of obtaining federal assistance by firm size class  
The underlying results suggest that this result is largely driven by the fact that obtaining a tax 
holiday appears to be considerably easier at the regional level and is easier for larger firms. 
However we surmise that the small variations present are less discernible the higher the level 
aggregation.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 5.13 Has company received federal assistance? 
  Yes (%)  No (%)  No. obs 
 
Moscow 31.4  68.6  35 
Moscow region  37.5  62.5  40 
St. Petersburg  28.6  71.4  28 
St. Petersburg region  21.4  78.6  14 
Nizhny Novgorod  49.2  50.8  59 
Samara 35.9  64.1  39 
Ekaterinburg 29.5  70.5  44 
Perm 25.0  75.0  40 
Novosibirsk 12.9  87.1  31 
Krasnoyarsk 28.6  71.4  28 
Volgograd 27.3  72.7  11 
Chelyabinsk 22.2  77.8  18 
Omsk 41.7  58.3  12 
Average 31.8  68.2  399 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 5.5 - Ease of obtaining regional assistance by firm size class William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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At the regional level the results presented in table 5.13 show that firms in Nizhny Novgorod, 
Omsk, Moscow (city and region) and Samara have generally obtained federal assistance more 
frequently than elsewhere, where the opposite holds for Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, the St 
Petersburg region and for Omsk. Table 5.14 illustrates that although there is less variation in the 
receipt of regional state assistance firms in Samara and Chelyabinsk appear to have received less, 
with the largest proportions of firms receiving assistance being in the St Petersburg region 
(although the sample contains only 14 firms), Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow city.  
 
Table 5.14 Has company received regional assistance? 
  Yes (%)  No (%)  No. obs 
 
Moscow 51.4  48.6  35 
Moscow region  42.5  57.5  40 
St. Petersburg  34.5  65.5  28 
St. Petersburg region  57.1  42.9  14 
Nizhny Novgorod  55.9  44.1  59 
Samara 23.1  76.9  39 
Ekaterinburg 27.3  72.7  44 
Perm 35.0  65.0  40 
Novosibirsk 38.7  61.3  31 
Krasnoyarsk 35.7  64.3  28 
Volgograd 36.4  63.6  11 
Chelyabinsk 22.2  77.8  18 
Omsk 41.7  58.3  12 
Average 38.8  61.2  399 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The highest proportion of firms reporting that they would find it impossible to obtain federal 
state assistance are found to be in Ekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk and Samara (75.51 percent, 72.22 
percent and 68.42 percent respectively against an average of 60.38 percent). One firm in 
Volgograd reports that it would find it very easy to obtain federal state assistance. At the regional 
level two firms in Volgograd claim that they would find it very easy to obtain regional state 
assistance (one of which is the firm that reported that it would find it very easy to obtain federal William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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state assistance) while two firms report that they would find this fairly easy in Moscow city and 
region, and one firm reports the same in Ekaterinburg and Krasnoyarsk. 
 
Finally we note that there is some consistent evidence of an industrial dimension to the pattern of 
firms receiving federal and regional state assistance in our sample as illustrated in tables 5.15 and 
5.16 below.  
 
Table 5.15 Has company received federal assistance? 
 Yes  No  No.  obs 
 
Chemicals 31.5  68.5  54 
Machinery 30.2  69.8  96 
Wood and paper  36.7  63.3  60 
Building materials  27.7  72.3  65 
Light industry  35.3  64.7  68 
Food industry  30.4  69.6  56 
Average 31.8  68.2  399 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 5.16 Has company received regional assistance? 
  Yes (%)  No (%)  No. obs 
Chemicals 37.0  63.0  54 
Machinery 38.5  61.5  96 
Wood and paper  40.0  60.0  60 
Building materials  32.3  67.7  65 
Light industry  48.5  51.5  68 
Food industry  35.7  64.3  56 
Average 38.8  61.2  399 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The wood and paper, and light industry sectors receive more assistance than the average at both 
the federal and regional level, a result that appears to be driven by a larger proportion of firms in 
these industries receiving direct state credits. The fewest incidences of federal and regional 
assistance both occur in the building materials sector.  
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5.3.4 Indicators of Overall Financial Constraint 
In order to be able to assess how financial constraints influence enterprise behaviour more 
clearly, we derive an aggregate financial constraint indicator as a composite of responses to the 
six questions on the ease of obtaining credit that were examined in detail above: short term and 
long term commercial credit; federal and regional state assistance, and Russian and foreign 
equity. As explained previously, each of these indicators is assessed on a 1 (very easy) to 5 
(impossible) scale. Rather than arbitrarily weighting these individual indicators, the overall 
measure is simply the arithmetic average of the six individual indicators. This average is then 
used to divide firms into three classes reflecting the degree to which they are financially 
constrained relative to other firms in the sample. The cut-off points for the classes were chosen 
in order to obtain a reasonably even distribution of firms between the three classes. Relatively 
unconstrained firms are therefore defined as those with an average score of 1 (very easy) to 10/3 
(slightly above fairly difficult); partially constrained firms are those with an average score from 
10/3 to 4 (very difficult), and relatively constrained firms have an average score from 4 to 5 
(impossible). This leads to 30.3 percent (132 firms) of our firms firms being classified as 
relatively financially unconstrained, 35.8 percent (156 firms) are classified as partially 
constrained and 33.9 percent (148 firms) are considered relatively constrained.  
 
The results of an ordered logit analysis of the distribution of this indicator by size, region and 
industry are presented in table 5.17 below. By including size, region and industry dummies as 
independent variables in this analysis we are able to establish the influence of each factor while 
controlling for the other factors e.g. the influence of size, controlling for industry and region.  
 
In order to avoid perfect collinearity the omitted case is that of a large firm in the food industry 
in St Petersburg city. The estimated coefficients allow us to establish that: 
 
•   Size    controlling for industry and region, small firms are more financially 
constrained than medium and large firms; 
•   Region   controlling for size and industry, firms in Moscow city, St Petersburg city and 
oblast, Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd are least financially constrained. Firms in 
Omsk, Moscow oblast and Krasnoyarsk appear to be the most financially 
constrained; William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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•   Industry controlling for size and region, firms in Stone & Clay are most financially 
constrained, followed by Machinery Building, Light industry and Wood & 
Paper. Firms in the Food industry (the omitted category) and Chemicals are 
least subject to financial constraint. 
•    
Table 5.17 Ordered Logit Analysis of Overall Financial Constraint 
 Food  industry 
Chemicals 0.54 
Machinery 1.12*** 
Wood and paper  1.00*** 
Building materials  1.55*** 
Light industry  1.10*** 
 Large  firm 
Small 0.65** 
Medium 0.03 
 St.  Petersburg 
Moscow 0.80 
Moscow region  1.48** 
St. Petersburg region  0.98 
Nizhny Novgorod  0.89 
Samara 1.04* 
Ekaterinburg 1.30** 
Perm 1.22** 
Novosibirsk 1.13** 
Krasnoyarsk 1.34** 
Volgograd 1.09 
Chelyabinsk 1.22* 
Omsk 3.13*** 
  
*, ** and *** illustrate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Having established an overall indicator of financial constraint and examined the underlying 
distribution relative to the key firm characteristics, the next section examines the implications of 
financial constraint. 
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5.4 Consequences of Financial Constraint 
We consider the consequences of financial constraints in three key areas: barter, restructuring 
and investment activity and financing.  
 
5.4.1 Barter 
Our survey contains two questions which allow us to obtain detailed information on the method 
of settlement that the firms in our sample use and accept. In these two questions firms were 
asked to report the share of their purchases from suppliers (and sales to customers) that were 
ultimately settled by cash or bank transfer, bills of exchange, debt swaps or offsets and exchange 
of goods for goods. The responses to these questions are presented in table 5.18 below. 
 
The first notable factor in table 5.18 is the similarity of method of settlement in the case of both 
purchases from suppliers or sales to customers. Secondly we note that cash or bank transfer is by 
far the largest individual category of settlement in both purchases and sales. By contrast our 
firms report that a relatively small proportion of activity is settled with bills of exchange 
(veksels). Finally we find the use of debt swaps or offsets and pure exchange of goods for goods 
to be significant — together they account for more than 36 percent of settlements. We regard 
these two components as what has become known as barter (see e.g. Commander and Mumssen 
(1999)) and hence conclude that the use of barter is significant in our sample. 
 
Table 5.18 Method of Settlement of Purchases from Suppliers and Sales to 
Customers (%) 
Form Mean 
(Median) 
No. obs 
    
Purchases settled by:    
Cash/bank transfer  54.6 (60.0)  421 
Bills of Exchange  6.3 (0.0)  421 
Debt swaps or offsets  20.6 (14.0)  402 
Exchange of goods for goods  17.3 (10.0)  423 
Other 0.6  (0.0)  421 
    
Sales settled by:    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Cash/bank transfer  57 (60.0)  421 
Bills of Exchange  6.0 (0.0)  421 
Debt swaps or offsets  20.4 (15.0)  406 
Exchange of goods for goods  15.6 (8.0)  406 
Other 0.3  (0.0)  423 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 5.19 Settlement Options by Overall Financial Constraint (mean (%), median 
(%), no. obs) 
Form Unconstrained  P.  Constrained Constrained 
 
 
Purchases settled by: 
 
   
Cash or bank transfer  67.67 
(75.00) 
131 
54.83 
(60.00) 
151 
41.70 
(30.00) 
138 
Bills of exchange  5.84 
(0.50) 
131 
5.91 
(3.00) 
151 
7.36 
(0.00) 
138 
Debt swaps or offsets  14.76 
(10.00) 
125 
20.48 
(15.00) 
141 
26.23 
(20.00) 
135 
Goods for goods  10.77 
(3.00) 
125 
17.50 
(10.00) 
141 
23.33 
(15.00) 
135 
Sales settled by:      
Cash or bank transfer  71.59 
(80.00) 
130 
57.47 
(60.00) 
152 
42.53 
(35.00) 
138 
Bills of exchange  5.25 
(0.00) 
130 
5.90 
(0.50) 
152 
6.99 
(0.00) 
138 
Debt swaps or offsets  13.48 
(10.00) 
126 
19.09 
(11.00) 
144 
28.27 
(20.00) 
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Goods for goods  8.31 
(2.50) 
126 
16.28 
(9.50) 
144 
21.83 
(10.00) 
135 
      
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In order to consider whether firms engage in barter as a reaction to being credit constrained, 
tables 5.19 disaggregates the settlement data in table 5.18 according to our overall financial 
constraint indictor. 
 
In each case we find that the proportion of settlement in cash or bank transfer declines 
monotonically as the severity of the credit constraint increases. Settlement in barter increases 
monotonically with the severity of the credit constraint, as do both barter sub-components. 
Finally, although use of settlement in veksels is limited in our sample, we also find this to be 
increasing monotonically with the degree to which firms are credit constrained. 
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Table 5.20 Settlement by size class (mean (%), median (%), no. obs) 
Form <500  501-1000  >1000 
 
 
Purchases settled by: 
 
   
Cash or bank transfer  54.0 
(60.0) 
144 
54.3 
(60.0) 
131 
53.7 
(60.0) 
123 
Bills of exchange  6.0 
(0.0) 
144 
6.1 
(0.0) 
131 
7.7 
(5.0) 
123 
Debt swaps or offsets  20.2 
(15.0) 
141 
20.8 
(10.0) 
125 
21.6 
(14.0) 
115 
Goods for goods  19.3 
(10.0) 
141 
17.2 
(10.0) 
125 
15.5 
(5.0) 
115 
      
Sales settled by:  
 
   
Cash or bank transfer  55.8 
(60.0) 
144 
57.4 
(65.0) 
132 
55.2 
(60.0) 
122 
Bills of exchange  5.3 
(0.0) 
144 
5.9 
(0.0) 
132 
7.6 
(2.0) 
122 
Debt swaps or offsets  20.3 
(15.0) 
141 
20.8 
(14.0) 
127 
21.8 
(15.0) 
116 
Goods for goods  18.3 
(10.0) 
141 
14.8 
(8.0) 
127 
14.1 
(4.5) 
116 
      
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Given that the preceding analysis has illustrated that our credit constraint variable differs by 
enterprise size, sector and region, it is unsurprising that we find these patterns to be replicated in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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our settlement data. What is surprising, however, is that we find the differences are not 
consistently observed across individual settlement options in the data presented in table 5.20. 
 
Our results illustrate that while there is no significant difference in the degree to which cash is 
used as settlement of purchases between different enterprise size categories, there is a marked 
difference in the form of non-monetary settlement. We find that larger firms consistently tend to 
make more use of bills of exchange and debt swaps, while smaller firms make more use of goods 
for goods settlement. It seems likely that this can be explained by the fact that larger firms have 
more bargaining power, particularly when transacting with utilities, than smaller firms. 
 
At the regional level we unsurprisingly find that use of non-monetary settlement is lowest in the 
relatively least financially constrained regions Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and 
Samara, as illustrated by figures 5.6 and 5.7 below.  
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Figure 5.6 - Settlement of purchases by region  
Conversely the highest instances of barter are reported in Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk and 
Volgograd. Interestingly, however, we find that while in most instances use of debt swaps or 
offsets exceeds use of exchange of goods for goods, the reverse is true in Moscow (city and 
region), St Petersburg region and Samara. In the case of Nizhny and Samara this may be due to a 
large number of smaller firms being contained in the regional sample. However, our samples in 
Moscow and St Petersburg contain a relatively high proportion of large firms, and hence this 
results cannot be solely attributed to size. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Finally we note that at the industrial level the building materials sector appears to engage in the 
most barter, both in respect of purchases and sales. By contrast the lowest incidences are 
reported in the food industry where more than 75 percent of sales and purchases are settled in 
cash or bank transfer. These results illustrate, however, that use of debt swaps or offsets exceeds 
that of exchange of goods for goods in all cases, save for settlement of purchases in the light 
industry sector. 
 
5.4.2 Restructuring 
Previously we have examined evidence of restructuring activity undertaken by firms. Within 
these indicators we categorised firms into examples of good firms, which undertook the 
restructuring activity in at least one of our three sample years, and bad firms which 
acknowledged that they would have liked to undertake the activity but did not. We found that of 
our 15 individual restructuring indicators, by far the largest proportion of firms have moved their 
products to new markets, changing suppliers, increased marketing of products and the 
implementation of new technologies for improving the quality of goods. In this sub-section we 
subdivide within these categories according to the degree to which the firms are subject to 
financial constraint, in order to establish the relation between restructuring and finance. Table 
5.21 below presents the results of this process. For each restructuring measure we have divided 
the total number of good firms according to our three financial constraint indicators, and have 
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done the same with the total number of bad firms. Therefore, within the row for each type of 
restructuring, the sum of the different levels of constraints is 100 percent for each of the groups 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ firms. At the simplest level we would expect that evidence of a negative 
correlation between financial constraint and restructuring would manifest itself in high numbers 
of good, unconstrained firms and bad constrained firms. 
 
Interestingly, we find limited evidence to support the notion that unconstrained firms are better 
in their undertaking of restructuring measures, where there is insufficient variation to draw 
conclusions. However, in the case of firms categorised as ‘bad’, financially constrained firms are 
more frequent, especially in activities that would be regarded as defensive restructuring activities 
such as labour shedding. Furthermore they appear to be less efficient in adapting to new market 
conditions through the launch of new products, a change of suppliers, the sale or lease of land or 
the restructuring of debt. 
 
We therefore interpret these findings as suggesting that the causality in these cases runs from 
undertaking the restructuring activity to financial constraint, rather than the reverse. Good firms 
are not strongly differentiated by financial constraint, hence implying that financial constraint 
does not preclude restructuring. By contrast more firms that did not restructure tend to be 
financially constrained, hence implying that a failure to restructure seems to lead to financial 
constraint.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 5.21 Restructuring Activity by Financial Constraint (%) 
 
Activity 
 
Very Good or Good 
 
(Unconstrained 
Partially Constrained 
Constrained) 
 
Bad 
 
(Unconstrained 
Partially Constrained 
Constrained) 
 
33.1 10.4 
36.8 31.3 
Launching of new products and services 
30.1 58.3 
26.5 35.7 
42.3 21.4 
Liquidation of unprofitable products 
31.2 42.9 
33.6 28.0 
32.8 28.0 
Cuts in expenditures for social infrastructure 
33.6 44.0 
25.3 41.7 
38.2 8.3 
Firing of the excess labor-force 
36.5 50.0 
32.9 26.3 
36.7 26.3 
Moves to new markets of your products 
30.4 47.4 
31.3 12.8 
39.4 31.9 
Increased marketing of your products 
29.3 55.3 
31.9 35.7 
35.8 28.6 
Reorganization of management 
32.3 35.7 
32.6 27.0 
34.8 36.5 
Implementation of new technologies for reducing 
fuel and energy consumption 
32.6 36.5 
34.0 24.7 
35.7 31.7 
Implementation of new technologies for reducing 
material and labor costs 
30.3 43.6 
35.1 17.6  Implementation of new technologies for 
38.3 33.8 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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improving the quality of goods  26.6 48.6 
23.3 25.0 
37.2 50.0 
Liquidation (closing-down) of unprofitable 
workshops 
39.5 25.0 
27.8 23.0 
35.6 30.8 
Sales (leasing-out) of the excess equipment 
36.6 46.2 
30.4 7.2 
36.8 35.7 
Sales (leasing-out) of real estate or land 
32.8 57.1 
28.8 12.5 
38.0 37.5 
Changing the suppliers 
33.2 50.0 
26.3 16.1 
38.4 30.4 
Restructuring of debt 
35.3 53.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
5.4.3 Investment Activity and Financing 
A mere 28.4 percent of the firms in our sample report undertaking a significant investment 
project since the August 1998 crisis. This group report a mean level of investment as a 
proportion of the capital stock of 0.12 in 1999, as compared to 0.04 for firms which did not 
undertake a significant investment project. 
 
Consequently, this distinction is reflected in the age profile of the capital stock of our enterprises. 
Table 5.22 below illustrates that the majority of the capital stock of the average firm in our 
sample is more than 15 years old, and just over 8 percent is less than five years old, and that the 
degree of financial constraint strongly influences the vintage of the capital stock .
20 
 
                                                 
20 This result is consistent with the finding that firms which reported undertaking a significant investment project 
since August 1998 have a considerably lower proportion of their capital stock in the upper age categories. Moreover, 
the mean percentage of equipment less than five years is three times larger for firms which report having undertaken 
a project than those which do not. 
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Table 5.22 Age profile of capital stock by credit constraint (% of total capital) 
 Unconstrained  Partially 
constrained 
Constrained  
<5 years  10.7 9.9  4.5 
5-10 years  17.0 16.2  11.5 
10-15 years  23.0 24.9  27.0 
>15 years  49.3 49.0  57.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
As figure 5.8 illustrates, investment levels are generally increasing over our sample period, from 
a mean of 0.031 in 1997 to 0.036 in 1998 and a sharp increase to 0.066 in 1999. This aggregate 
result is reflected by the rightwards shift in the distribution of gross investment during the study 
period: fewer firms report undertaking no investment, and the upper level of investment 
increases. 
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Figure 5.8 - Investment to capital ratio over time 
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Interestingly this general result does not differ significantly between industries. Although the 
food industry consistently undertakes more investment as a proportion of the capital stock than 
any other sector, all sectors increase their average level of investment over the sample horizon. 
Similarly although initial tests indicated that the investment ratio was positively correlated with 
company size, there is no apparent correlation between size and investment after controlling for 
the food industry.  Finally we note that there does appear to be some regional dimension to 
investment levels, with St Petersburg (city and region), Nizhny Novgorod and Volgograd 
undertaking consistently more investment than other regions. Although its investment rate was 
fourth lowest in 1997, Omsk appears to suffer through our sample period as its investment rate 
declines considerably in 1998 such that its investment ratio was the lowest of all regions in 1998 
and 1999.  
 
In response to the ‘What were the sources of your fixed investments (% of total)’ we find that 75 
percent of firms in each time period report investment to be entirely financed by retained 
earnings. Consequently these results suggest that the average firm that carried out an investment 
project since August 1998 financed more than 80 percent of the investment cost internally. In 
order to get a clearer picture of the proportions of alternative forms of investment finance, table 
5.23  presents the results of the same question after excluding those firms that fully internally 
financed. 
Table 5.23 Financing of investment of those who did not fully internally finance  
 1997  1998  1999 
 
Internal 43.4  43.2  51.6 
Emission of shares  4.3  0.07  0.03 
Bank credits  35.4  36.4  28.3 
Federal budget  3.3  3.4  0 
Regional budget  3.9  0  2.5 
Russian sources  4.2  11.0  12.4 
 
These results illustrate that, even for firms that did not fully internally finance, use of internal 
funds remains the dominant financing choice, closely followed by bank credits. While bank-
based funding increased slightly in 1998, the considerable decline in 1999 is most likely due to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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the impact of the August 1998 crisis. This may also explain the dramatic decline in financing via 
share emission in 1998 and 1999, and the decline in the use of foreign sources. Russian sources 
have increased considerably over the sample period and firms increased their reliance on internal 
funds as a consequence in 1999, to more than half the value of investment at the mean. 
 
According to the pecking order of corporate finance, one would expect firms firstly to utilise 
internal funds before raising finance from external sources. Hence at one level, the strong 
reliance on internal finance in our sample may simply reflect corporate choice. This, however, 
fails to consider whether the supply of external funds is constrained; their use therefore being 
imposed upon firms rather than chosen by firms. Moreover, if internal funds are limited, 
investment itself may be constrained. In order to assess the extent to which this is the case, table 
5.24 below disaggregates the investment ratio according to our overall financial constraint 
indicator
21. 
Table 5.24 Investment Ratio by Overall Financial Constraint (mean, median, nobs) 
 1999 
 
Unconstrained 0.097 
(0.043) 
110 
 
Partially constrained  0.072 
(0.026) 
140 
 
Constrained 0.034 
(0.003) 
129 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
5.4.4 Barter, Investment and Performance 
Having found a negative correlation between investment and the degree to which the enterprise 
is credit constrained, we firstly test the correlation between overall credit constraints and various 
                                                 
21 Although we have investment data for each period of our survey, our financial constraint indicator is time-
invariant. Hence, given the timing of our survey, we only cross-cut our 1999 investment data with our financial 
constraint.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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additional indicators of enterprise performance. The results presented in table 5.25 below 
illustrate the strong negative correlation that exists between the overall credit constraint and our 
various performance measures. 
 
Table 5.25 Overall credit constraint to all performance measures other than 
investment (indexed) 
 Mark-up  ROE  Π/K Prod. 
Unconstrained 100  100  100  100 
Partially cons.  76.4  70.0  69.0  87.2 
Constrained 41.5  34.1  38.0  55.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
We note, however, one caveat on these results, in that they should not be interpreted as reflecting 
causality. While on the one hand it may be that being credit constrained determines performance, 
it could be argued that performance may equally determine credit access. This may occur 
through state assistance to poorly performing firms, although this is less likely given that our 
firms are privatised and state financing has been found to be limited in our sample. Alternatively, 
given the nature of the banking sector and the short credit history of the firms in our sample, it 
may be that currently poorly performing firms suffer from limited access to bank finance. 
Nonetheless, at a simple level our results permit us to establish a negative correlation between 
financial constraints and performance.  
 
We have previously, however, determined that firms that are more financially constrained tend to 
engage in more barter settlement and that they undertake less investment
22. Consequently in the 
next stage of our analysis we examine the correlation between barter and performance (including 
investment) and investment and performance. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Consequently, we find that firms that engage in more barter tend to have a larger proportion of relatively old 
capital stock. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 5.26 Barter and Performance (1999) 
 Mark-up  ROE  Π /K  Productivity I/K 
Purchases settled 
by:  
       
Debt Swaps or 
Offsets 
-ve* -ve**  -ve***  -ve*** -ve** 
Exchange of 
Goods for Goods 
-ve** -ve***  -ve*** -ve*** -ve*** 
Sales settled 
by:  
       
Debt Swaps or 
Offsets 
0 (-ve)  -ve***  -ve***  -ve***  -ve** 
Exchange of 
Goods for Goods 
-ve*** -ve*** -ve***  -ve***  -ve*** 
*, ** and *** illustrate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively 
Mark-up represents profits after tax divided by total sales, ROE represents return on equity, Π /K represents 
return on assets, productivity is sales per employee and productivity growth is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of current period productivity to previous period productivity. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Table 5.26 therefore presents the sign and significance of the barter coefficients obtained from a 
series of OLS regressions in which barter, size, region and industry are regressed against several 
various alternative measures of performance.  
 
The first four columns of table 5.26 illustrate the strength of the negative correlation between 
barter and performance. While the direction of causality is constant, as even those correlations 
reported as insignificant are of a negative sign, the results are slightly stronger in the case of 
exchange of goods for goods. The final column provides support for the hypothesis that firms 
engaging in barter tend to undertake less investment activity. Moreover this results is slightly 
stronger in the case of firms engaging in pure goods for goods barter than debt swaps or offsets. 
Given that our prior results indicate the engaging in barter tends to be a reaction to financial 
constraint, this therefore suggests that causality may run from financial constraint to barter to 
investment.  
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In this light we consider the relation between investment and performance. As in the case of 
barter we control for size, region and industry, and regress these together with a one period lag 
investment of the investment to capital ratio against our performance measures. The sign and 
significance of the coefficient on lagged investment are reported in table 5.27 below. 
 
5.27 Investment and performance (1999) 
 Mark-up  ROE  Π /K  Productivity
Investment to 
Capital ratio 
+ve*** +ve*** +ve***  +ve*** 
*, ** and *** illustrate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively 
Mark-up represents profits after tax divided by total sales, ROE represents return on equity, Π /K represents 
return on assets, productivity is sales per employee and productivity growth is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of current period productivity to previous period productivity. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
We find investment to be consistently positively correlated with each of our performance 
measures at less than the one percent level. However, although we lag investment in a simple 
attempt to reduce endogeneity tests with alternative lag structures revealed that our investment 
data is fairly autoregressive. Hence we suggest that one should be cautious when attributing 
causality to this relationship. Nonetheless, we maintain that our results suggest that financial 
constraints are associated with restricted investment activity, which is in turn  highly correlated 
with poorer performance. 
 
6.  A Portrait of Successful Russian Industrial Enterprise 
 
This section is a very straightforward attempt to answer the question ‘What characterises a 
successful industrial enterprise in the Russian economy?’. We start by presuming that we know 
how a good enterprise should perform, and hence divide our sample into ‘good’ (successful) and 
not so good enterprises. We then compare several different indicators — some of which reflect 
performance — between these groups and examine in what way our groups are different. In so 
doing, we aim to synthesise the preceding sections and so develop a better understand of what 
makes a firm good and successful. The concluding sub-section tests several hypotheses that may 
explain the relative success of a certain group of enterprises and failures of another.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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6.1 What Constitutes a Successful Industrial Enterprise In Russia? 
The first step, and probably the most complicated one, is to define what we mean by 
‘successful’. We have several options including using flow measures such as profits or stock 
measures related to accumulated assets or capital, or controlling for industry specifics — for 
example, by measuring relative performance in comparison to industrial averages. However, at 
the simplest level we suggest.  
Criteria 1. A good enterprise should generate positive value added. 
Obviously, this definition of a ‘good’ firm is arbitrary and debatable. However, at least it is 
based on a relatively clear-cut concept and does not include a lot of arbitrary threshold 
coefficients. Moreover, this criteria was included because there is a great deal of speculation that 
Russian industry is populated by enterprises that produce negative value added and only remain 
afloat due to soft budget constraints — state direct and indirect subsidies, non-payments, and so 
on. Analysis showed that our sample contains very few such enterprises (14 enterprises or 4 
percent of the sample in 1997, and no such enterprises in 1998 and 1999). To some extent this 
may be due to the aforementioned biases in our sampling, and may also reflect crude 
measurement of value added itself, which we calculate as sales minus material costs. 
Nonetheless, this criteria was included to ensure that we drop such enterprises from the ‘good’ 
group.
23 
Criteria 2. A good enterprise generates positive profits. 
While this seems a natural supposition, there are certain factors which cause us to question this 
criteria. Firstly, losses may be temporal and due to exogenous factors out of the control of 
enterprise. Secondly, hiding profits is a common and a well-known practice for firms in 
transition economies — and is not exclusive to firms in transition economies. Hence solid, 
productive enterprises may simply show losses and transfer their profits elsewhere. We find that 
the first counter-argument can be disregarded (at least for our sample) as 75 percent of our 
sampled enterprises managed to generate positive profits even in the 1998 (more than 80 percent 
in 1999). By contrast we cannot deal directly with the second argument; instead we propose to 
consider a firm to be good only if it is to some extent ‘honest’ and does not hide all generated 
profits. 
                                                 
23 Accounting  practice sometimes allows enterprises with negative VA to be profitable. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Criteria 3. A good enterprise is always profitable. 
A firm may generate positive profits occasionally while being a loss-maker on average. It is 
possible to calculate a 3-year average profit measure from our dataset but we do not have 
sufficiently reliable deflators to permit us to accurately compare profits from different time 
periods. Instead, for the sake of this analysis, we presume that a good firm generates positive 
profits for all three years of our sample (1997-1999). This of course may be a significant 
constraint if we take into the account that 1998 was a crisis year, and hence an enterprise needed 
either a high level of profitability or good management not to post losses during the general 
financial chaos. However, in fact a large proportion of firms in our sample meet the requirement: 
around 70 percent of our sampled enterprises — 282 out of the 400 enterprises for which we 
have data for all three years — meet the criteria, which is almost the same number as the average 
profit-makers each year. 
 
We do recognize the fact that we may lose some good firms that posted losses in 1998 as a result 
of hard-currency credits that they received in the previous years — for modernization or other 
objectives — becoming very expensive due to the devaluation. We interpret such a situation as 
indicating that managers/owners of these firms failed to evaluate the associated risks properly 
and  were insufficiently cautious. Hence whereas in selecting profitable firms we were biased in 
favour of ‘honest’ ones, in this case we are conscious of inducing what could be interpreted as a 
bias in favour of ‘clever’ firms
24. 
Criteria 4. A good firm’s output should not be too volatile. 
If the management is good and reacts quickly to the changing economic environment, a firm can 
be profitable by squeezing the volume of output — and costs. We want our good firm’s 
performance to be stable not only in terms of profits but also in terms of output. In principle we 
could demand no fall in output in constant prices. That would mean (a) having price indexes for 
each enterprise or some proxy — difficult but not unimaginable — and (b) losing a lot of good 
firms due to instability in 1998 prices. In order to not be too tough on the enterprises we instead 
formulated a soft criteria: ‘a good firm should have no decline in nominal output’. Nonetheless it 
                                                 
24 Actually the check on those firms that were profitable in 1997 but became loss-makers in 1998 showed that most 
of their performance characteristics (i.e. mark-up, return on equity, etc.) in 1997 were very close to ‘bad’ group 
means and distinctly different from other groups. Thus, we lost some "good" but unlucky guys but not many. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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was surprising that this ‘soft’ requirement appeared to be much harder to meet than requiring the 
enterprises to make profits in every year of the sample. Only 48.6 percent — 195 enterprises — 
of enterprises met the criteria. 
Criteria 5. A good firm thinks about the future and invests into fixed assets. 
Despite this tough criteria, finding that 48.6 percent of our firms can be regarded as good seems 
a lot, at least for the Russian economy. We therefore introduced the last criteria in order to select 
leaders from the good group, to establish a group of what could be called ‘very good’ firms. The 
criteria is based on an indicator of the investment activity of the firm. This choice is not an 
obvious one, and is somewhat contentious. For instance, a firm may not invest because it has 
spare capacity and does not need invest. Alternatively it may not invest into fixed assets every 
year, but instead accumulates money for big a investment project and makes financial 
investments or purchases other firms’ equity. Moreover, to measure investment activity over 
time one should control for prices, etc., and we do not have sufficiently detailed deflators to 
permit this.  
 
Instead we simply set a threshold to separate firms on the basis of their investment activity: 
namely that total net investment for the three year period — the sum of total investment for the 
three years of our sample less the sum of fixed capital depreciation charged to costs in the same 
period —  should be positive. An obvious reason for choosing this threshold is that it allows us 
to separate firms that compensate for the losses of their fixed capital by investing depreciation 
money into modernization and/or buying new equipment and facilities. 
 
This is, however, actually a very ‘soft’ constraint for the Russian firms, as the assets of industrial 
enterprises — especially installed more than ten years ago — are usually undervalued, and 
generally badly measured. Moreover depreciation tends to be smaller than the cost of renewing 
capacities lost due to wear-and-tear of equipment. On the other hand, firms with newer and better 
equipment — for example, imported recently — would find it harder to meet this requirement 
than firms with outdated fixed assets. In our sample 123 enterprise (more than 30 percent of our 
sample) had accumulated investments that exceeded accumulated depreciation charges. 
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One can of course consider a variety of other criteria. For example, profits may be, and often are, 
generated nominally through barter transactions with little cash inflows; thus, liquidity may be a 
good indicator for selecting good enterprises. The level of indebtedness may also convey a lot of 
information about the financial situation of the enterprise. Nevertheless, for the obvious reason 
of wishing to have statistically significant groups we regard the above criteria as sufficient for 
our purposes. 
 
It is easy to see that the third criteria — positive profits for three years — includes the first two 
criteria as subsets. Thus in effect we have three significant constraints on good enterprises: (i) 
profitability for three years; (ii) non-decreasing nominal output, and (iii) investment activity. 
Consequently for this analysis we constructed three groups of enterprises that do not overlap. 
The first group consists of enterprises that are neither constant profit-makers (a) nor have non-
decreasing sales — i.e. firms that do not meet criteria (i) or (ii). For the sake of comparison we 
consider these firms as ‘bad’, but with understanding that they are not actually bad, just that their 
performance according to our criteria is worse than our other groups. The second group of 
enterprises meet requirements (i) and (ii) but not the investment activity criteria (iii). We regard 
these firms as relatively ‘good’. The last group includes enterprises that meet all our 
requirements, and we regard these as ‘very good’. We also note that between these groups 
investment activity has little to do with profitability criteria, as almost half of firms actively 
investing are in the ‘bad’ group. 
Table 6.1 Firms distribution by groups (percent)
25 
Groups Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
 
1 Bad  245  60.9  60.9 
2 Good  91  22.6  83.6 
3 Very  good  66  16.4  100.0 
Total 402  100.00   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                                                 
25 Number of firms less than the sample due to missing values in data. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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6.2 How Do Good Firms Differ from Bad Firms? 
We find that the concentration of our good and bad groups differ by industry and region, but 
there is little evidence of a size effect. As table 6.2 below illustrates, unsurprisingly, good and 
bad enterprises are not evenly distributed by industries. Our very good enterprises tend to be 
concentrated in the Chemical and Food industries.  
 
Table 6.2 Distribution by Industry (percent) 
Industry   Bad  Good  Very good  Total 
Chemicals 62.3  11.3  26.4  100 
Machinery 62.4  24.7  12.9  100 
Wood and paper  67.2  20.7  12.1  100 
Building materials  63.6  24.2  12.1  100 
Light industry  65.7  22.9  11.4  100 
Food industry  40.7  29.6  29.6  100 
Total 60.9  22.6  16.4  100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
At the regional level, table 6.3 below illustrates that the share of good and very good firms 
generally falls when we move from West to East. The exception is the Moscow region where this 
share is lower than in the Volga macro-zone. 
 
Table 6.3 Distribution by Region (percent) 
Macro-Zones Bad  Good  Very  good  Total 
North-West  38.5 28.2 33.3  100 
Central  58.9 26.0 15.1  100 
Volga  51.9 28.3 19.8  100 
Ural  67.3 17.8 14.9  100 
Siberia 77.1  15.7  7.2  100 
Total  60.9 22.6 16.4  100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In terms of size however, we find that the average number of employees in bad and good 
enterprises does not differ significantly (table 6.4 below). In the very good group in 1999 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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enterprises are on average 25 percent larger mostly due to a sharp decrease in employment in the 
bad enterprises in 1998 and 1999 (in 1997 the difference was 12 percent). Moreover, all the 
groups are similarly distributed and include relatively small, medium and large-size firms. 
Table 6.4 Distribution by Size  
Average number of employees  1997  1998  1999 
Bad  964 893 850 
Good  909 874 869 
Very good  1083 1062 1066 
Sample mean   969  920  891 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
There are, however, several significant differences between the groups and some cases where a 
priori expected differences were not found to be significant, and we summarise these below. 
Some of these results have more or less obvious explanations, while others have ambiguous 
interpretations. We examine each of these six features in turn. 
6.2.1 Performance 
By definition our good and very good firms perform better than bad ones. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to see how much better,  and whether the differences between groups increase over 
time. Table 6.5 below presents various performance measures by groups. 
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Table 6.5. Performance Indicators by Groups 
  1997 1998  1999 
Variable/Group bad  good  very 
good 
bad good very 
good 
bad good very 
good 
               
Mark-Up  0.06  0.15  0.17 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.05  0.14  0.19 
ROE  0.05  0.09  0.20 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.09  0.23  0.35 
Π /K  0.17  0.22  0.40 0.12 0.32 0.51 0.24  0.57  0.83 
VA  38.73  30.97  55.34 33.38 44.33 70.49 52.61  68.02 110.58 
Sales/worker  83.01 72.89 121.04  72.51  91.30  147.68 119.07 153.41 262.63 
∆  Sales/worker  na  na  na  -0.09 0.27 0.26 0.47  0.52  0.57 
∆  Sales  na  na  na  -0.18 0.25 0.27 0.39  0.54  0.59 
∆  Employment  na na  na -0.08  0.00  0.00  -0.06  0.02 0.01 
∆ 2 Sales/worker  na  na  na na na na  0.37  0.80  0.83 
∆ 2 Sales  na  na  na na na na  0.21  0.78  0.86 
∆ 2 Employment  na  na  na na na na  -0.14  0.02  0.02 
Inv/sales  0.02  0.01  0.05 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02  0.01  0.06 
Inv/K  0.02  0.01  0.10 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05  0.04  0.20 
M_cost  0.55  0.54  0.61 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.56  0.60  0.67 
K/Labour  1.03  0.76  0.89 0.99 0.75 0.92 1.00  0.71  1.03 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The first finding concerns the difference between good and very good groups. Our very good 
group includes much better performers than good group, but unexpectedly good firms were less 
productive than bad enterprises before 1999, both in terms of sales/employees and per capita 
value added indicators. Our very good firms only became significantly better in this sense in 
1999, an issue that we return to below. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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There are, however, several more or less obvious results from the comparison of our three 
groups: 
•   The level of capacity utilization is significantly higher in the good group and even more 
so in the very good group; 
•   The equipment vintage is much better in better groups; 
•   Better groups have less excess labour. In particular no firm in the very good group has 
more that 10 percent of excess labour; 
•   Better firms pay considerably higher wages and the difference between groups increases 
through time; 
•   The share of exports is higher for better groups. This result is however driven by the fact 
that a larger number of firms in the better groups engage in export activity. The average 
share of exports among firms engaged in export sales does not differ by groups. In other 
words if you are an exporter you have more chances to be good.
26  
 
6.2.2 Financing  
We find that good enterprises receive a significantly higher proportion of revenues from their 
customers in money and settle a higher proportion of their purchases from suppliers in money. 
Firms in our bad and good groups deal slightly more in surrogates with suppliers than with 
customers. The share of barter received from customers is almost identical to that used to settle 
purchases from suppliers in very good firms 
Rather surprisingly we find that the average interest rate enterprises expect to pay for short-term 
bank credit does not differ much by groups (36, 36 and 32 percent for bad, good and very good 
firms respectively). On the other hand both short and even more so long-term credits are more 
readily available to better performing enterprises. Forty-five percent of bad firms report that they 
find it easy or fairly easy to obtain short-term credit, relative to 65 percent of good firms and 75 
percent of very good firms; the equivalent proportions long-term credit are 15, 30 and 38 percent 
respectively. 
                                                 
26 One more conclusion may be of some interest because it contradicts the common view that being an exporter in 
Russia makes a firm profitable. The share of exporters in the bad group was 40 percent in 1997, rising to 44 percent 
in 1999. The good group have a stable share of exporting firms of 51 percent, while the very good group also have a 
stable share of  57 percent. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Equity financing is almost non existent in all groups but there are certain differences in the level 
of optimism: only 3 percent of bad firms believe that it would be easy or fairly easy to sell newly 
emitted shares to foreign investors, 9 percent of the good and 11 percent of very good firms are 
optimistic. Interestingly, around half of the optimists in the good group believe it to be very easy 
whereas no firms in the very good group believe this to be the case. Eight percent of firms in the 
first group believe it easy to sell equity to Russian investor, against 10 and 21 percent for good 
and very good groups respectively. Again the proportion of ‘radical’ optimists — reporting that 
it would be very easy — is much higher among the managers of the good group (50 percent) 
against less than 8 percent among the very good group. This fact is worth remembering when we 
discuss management. 
 
Finally, we find that levels of debt are naturally lower at better firms when measured relative to 
either sales, profits or to capital. At the same time the overdue debt to overall debt ratio while 
lower in the second and the third group is still rather high. 
 
6.2.3 Relations with State and State Policy 
We find that Federal and Regional authorities do not show any biases towards any group. Tax 
holidays are more frequently granted to good enterprises (most likely as profit tax holidays 
which bad firms can’t have as they are loss-makers by definition). By contrast restructuring of 
debt is more usual for bad firms. Direct subsidies are so rare that while 4 percent of bad 
enterprise report receiving them relative to 1.5 percent in very good group, the numbers reporting 
form too small a sample for definite conclusions. 
 
There appears to be no difference in firms’ expectations of receiving state assistance. Although 
our good group is on average very slightly more optimistic about the possibility of getting state 
assistance, the difference is insignificant. Sixty percent rate the opportunity of getting assistance 
from the Federal authorities as impossible in all groups, while 45 percent in each group report 
that they would find it impossible to get assistance from the Regional government.  
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The share of enterprises complaining of problems caused by administrative barriers is almost the 
same across groups. Better firms, being more active, report encountering problems with licensing 
and permits slightly more frequently. Better firms also report being more concerned about social 
charges and profit taxes for obvious reasons. 
 
6.2.4 Ownership and Corporate Governance 
The structure of ownership at the time of privatisation is almost identical for the three groups. At 
the beginning of 2000 our groups do not differ very significantly, but such differences as are 
present are peculiar: bad and very good firms have more or less the same ownership structure 
with about 60 percent of shares belonging to insiders, 35 percent to outsiders and 5 percent to the 
state. Surprisingly, as table 6.6 illustrates, the good group has a significantly lower share of 
outsiders (25 percent) with a correspondingly higher share of insiders (68 percent) and state (7 
percent). Analysis of the board composition confirms the same picture with a higher share of 
insiders on the board in the second group. 
 
In terms of the distribution of control, the picture is even more clear: 35 percent of our bad group 
of firms are outsider controlled (defined as the position where outsiders own more than 50 
percent of the stock), 33 percent are outsider controlled in the very good category but the good 
group has only 19 percent of outsider controlled firms. 
There are too few firms with foreign investors (5 percent in the bad group and about 10 percent 
in the two others) to make any statistically valid conclusions. Nevertheless, one significant 
feature is that the average shareholding of foreigners (if they are present among the shareholders) 
increases with the quality of the firm:  28 percent in the bad group, 37 percent in the good group, 
65 percent in the very good group. 
Table 6.6 Ownership Structure by Groups (percent) 
 Bad  Good  Very  Good 
At time of privatisation 
Insiders  
(Managers & Workers) 
71.3 73.3 74.2 
State 11.4  13.3  13.0 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Outsiders 17.3  13.4  12.9 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Managers  
(where possible) 
13.3 14.5  8.9 
At 01.01.2001 
Insiders  
(Managers & Workers) 
61.1 67.9 59.2 
State 5.4  7.0  5.0 
Outsiders 33.5  25.1  35.8 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Managers 
(where possible) 
16.6 21.1 12.8 
Change from time of privatisation to 01.01.2001 
Insiders 
(Managers & Workers) 
-10.2 -5.4 -15.0 
State -6.1  -6.3  -8.0 
Outsiders 16.2  11.7  23.0 
Managers 
(where possible) 
3.2 6.6 3.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Finally, we note that ownership tends to me more concentrated in the bad and very good group 
than in the good category. More than 30 percent of firms in the bad and very good groups have 
either a single block-holder (a single owner with more than 25 percent of the total stock of the 
firm) or have 1 to 3 owners controlling more than 50 percent of the stock. In the middle group 
only 20 percent have concentrated ownership. 
 
6.2.5 Management 
The only significant difference between groups is the lower rotation of management in the good 
group compared with bad one. This corresponds with domination of insider-controlled firms in 
the group and higher share of management ownership. In addition, two other features of this 
group are suggestive if not significant: managers in the good group less frequently report 
education in economics, and have a higher share of insiders entering into the position of General 
Manager. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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6.2.6 Restructuring 
In general the better enterprise, the more active it is in restructuring activity. At the same time we 
find the same patter as above in several specific indicators of restructuring, where the good group 
differ from two others, while the bad and very good are similar (see table 6.7 below). 
 
Table 6.7 Some Restructuring Activity Indicators by Groups (percent of each group 
reporting having undertaken reform in last 3 years) 
Activity/Group Bad  Good  Very  Good 
Liquidation of unprofitable products  1.1  1.1  1.3 
Moves to new markets of your products  1.7  1.7  2.1 
Reorganization of management  1.4  1.3  1.6 
Implementation of new technologies for 
reducing material and labour costs 
1.1 1.1  1.5 
Sales (leasing-out) of the excess 
equipment 
1.2 0.8  1.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
6.3 What is Different about Good Firms? 
It should be stressed that in many cases we do not have a large enough sample in each group for 
any statistically valid conclusions. Nonetheless, it is possible to make some tentative judgements 
of the ways in which firms in our three groups differ from one another.  
 
Our first finding is that there are significant differences between our good and very good groups 
of firms, although in some cases this difference is more prominent than that between the bad and 
very good groups. By definition our good and very good categories were separated on the basis 
of their investment activity. The good group contains firms that were  are profitable but did not 
invest, while firms in the very good group were profitable by do invest. Hence by construction 
investment, which is an extremely important indicator in terms of ability to restructure, reflects 
basic differences between types of enterprises in our sample. 
The good group is predominantly insider-owned with a higher management share in ownership. 
Firms in this group were typically less productive in 1997 and 1998 but significantly increased William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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their labour productivity in 1999. The ownership here is less concentrated and while trends are 
the same, changes in ownership are slower. Management rotation in this group is also less 
intensive that in the two other groups, hence accordingly they are less active in reorganization of 
management as a restructuring activity. In terms of other restructuring activity good firms are 
also inclined to be less active on their markets (less active in dropping unprofitable products, and 
movement to new markets) and less concerned about costs (less implementation of technology 
for labour and material cost reduction, less sales of equipment). A lot of other minor details also 
contribute to the impression that these firms are quite satisfied with themselves and do not wish 
(or do not need) to change much. 
 
6.3.1 What Makes Them Tick? 
 
Hypothesis 1. Good firms were initially good. 
One possible explanation for these findings is that simply some firms were lucky enough to find 
themselves in a better position at the time of mass privatisation, and kept their advantages 
through the 1990s. To check this supposition table 6.8 displays the results of calculations of the 
profits (losses) to output ratio for each group of firms using data from Goskomstat. The data does 
not display any significant patterns by group until 1995
27. Consequently we can conclude that 
there were no significant difference in initial performance between groups.  
 
We propose two possible factors to explain the difference that emerge from 1995. Firstly, 1995 
was the year when financial stabilization in Russia started: inflation fell and the exchange rate 
stabilised. Moreover volatility in the structure of prices ended in 1994 — including energy and 
natural monopolies tariffs — and hence it may be that the new price structure polarised the 
differences between good and bad firms in the new market economy. A second explanation may 
be that the differentiation between groups is a product of new owners’ policy and decisions 
following the completion of the mass privatisation programme in 1994. 
                                                 
27 The check with return on capital (profits to capital) and cost per ruble of output gives a similar results. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 6.8 Retrospective Performance by Groups 
   Bad  Good  Very  Good
1990 No.  Obs.  123  58  36 
 Proftiabiity  0.14  0.17  0.16 
 ROE  0.24  0.34  0.29 
 Cost/sales  (%)  na  na  na 
        
1991 No.  Obs.  165  69  48 
 Proftiabiity  0.21  0.23  0.24 
 ROE  0.62  0.84  0.84 
 Cost/sales  (%)  na  na  na 
        
1992 No.  Obs.  197  79  52 
 Proftiabiity  0.23  0.27  0.27 
 ROE  0.40  0.56  0.57 
 Cost/sales  (%)  73.43  74.54  71.76 
        
1993 No.  Obs.  211  83  56 
 Proftiabiity  0.23  0.27  0.25 
 ROE  1.47  2.17  1.86 
 Cost/sales  (%)  75.80  71.27  72.18 
        
1994 No.  Obs.  216  80  58 
 Proftiabiity  0.27  0.26  0.29 
 ROE  0.26  0.38  0.50 
 Cost/sales  (%)  86.13  79.79  77.06 
        
1995 No.  Obs.  235  90  63 
 Proftiabiity  0.14  0.20  0.23 
 ROE  na  na  na 
 Cost/sales  (%)  84.95  80.88  77.71 
        
1996 No.  Obs.  241  91  66 
 Proftiabiity  0.02  0.11  0.13 
 ROE  na  na  na 
 Cost/sales  (%)  100.23  90.43  86.11 
Source: Authors’ calculations William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Hypothesis 2. Good enterprises became private earlier. 
As table 6.9 illustrates, a quick check on the date of privatisation by group showed that while 
there are slightly more ‘late-comers’ among the bad group, and more early privatised firms 
among the very good group, there is no difference between first two groups. Hence the evidence 
does not appear to support this hypothesis. 
Table 6.9 Date of Privatisation by Groups 
  Before 1993  1993  1994  After 1994  Total 
 No. 
Obs 
% No. 
Obs 
% No. 
Obs  
% No. 
Obs 
% No. 
Obs 
% 
Bad  116 48.9 67  28.3  31 13.1 12  5.1 226 100 
Good  45  52.9  24  28.2  6 7.1 5 5.9  80  100 
Very  Good  34  57.6  18  30.5  2 3.4 2 3.4  56  100 
Total  195 51.2  109  28.6  39 10.2 19  5.0 362 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Hypothesis 3. Good enterprises get profits due to imperfect competition. 
Two indicators were used to check this assumption: the competition level on the domestic 
markets and the degree of competition from imported goods. 
 
As table 6.10 illustrates, a significantly lower share of firms in the very good category reported 
that they have less than 2 competitors on the regional market. By contrast a slightly higher 
proportion of good firms than bad firms report this to be the case. The same is true, although to a 
slightly lesser extent, with respect to competition on the Russian market, although the number of 
observations for monopolists is too small to make any strong conclusions. Thus, we suggest that 
at least some of the well-being of the good group is due to weak competition (as discussed in 
section 4 above). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 6.10 Competition on the Regional and Domestic Russian Markets by Groups 
(number of competitors) 
Regional Market Competition  
 
 Bad Good  Very  good 
 No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
no  comp. 84  34.71 34.71 33  36.26  36.26  20  30.77 30.77 
1 firm   24  9.92  44.63  10  10.99  47.25  3  4.62  35.38 
2-5  firms 68  28.10 72.73 21  23.08  70.33  23  35.38 70.77 
>5  firms 66  27.27 100  27  29.67  100  19  29.23 100 
Total  242 100   91 100    65  100  
 
Domestic Russian competition 
 
 Bad Good  Very  good 
 No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
No. 
Obs 
% Cum. 
% 
no  comp.  6  2.67 2.67 6  6.90  6.90  3  4.84 4.84 
1  firm    9  4.00 6.67 5  5.75  12.64 2  3.23 8.06 
2-5  firms 64  28.44 35.11 20  22.99  35.63  17  27.42 35.48 
>5  firms  146 64.89  100 56 64.37  100  40  64.52  100 
Total  225 100   87 100    62  100  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Secondly we try to evaluate the competitive pressure on each enterprise by calculating the 
following indicator:  
  Comp_in=r_mshr*comp_r + d_mshr*comp_d   (6.1) 
where: 
r_mshr represents the share of the enterprise’s sales to the regional market; 
d_mshr represents the share of the enterprise’s sales to the domestic Russian market (i.e. 
outside of the region the enterprise is located in); 
comp_r  is a dummy variable equal to zero if there less than 2 competitors on the regional 
market for the enterprise and one otherwise; 
comp_d is an identically formed dummy for activity on the Russian market. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Hence this indicator represents the strength of competition faced by the firm by weighting the 
competition dummy variables for the regional and domestic Russian markets according to the 
shares of the relative markets in sales. 
 
The group means of this indicator are: bad group 0.72, good 0.67 and very good 0.69, reflecting 
the slightly higher level of monopoly and duopoly in the good group. The percentage of firms 
reporting that they face significant import competition is lower in the good and very good 
groups, though not significantly (37 percent in the bad group relative to 34 percent in the good 
group and 32 percent in the very good group.%). Within this, it is interesting to note the low 
number of firms reporting that they face any significant competition from imports.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Good enterprises are ‘honest’ ones that show profit. 
We had no questions directly aimed at measuring shadow activity of the firms. So, two very 
crude proxy indicators were constructed to try to capture different shadow economy effects.  
 
Firstly, we tried to capture transfer of profits from the enterprise through transfer pricing. To do 
that we need prices (or at least price indexes) for each enterprise. In other words we need output 
dynamic in constant and nominal prices. We use the following very simple indicator: 
  () A F U K
Sales
PIndex
_ _ ∆ × ∆
∆
=    (6.2) 
where: 
PIndex is the computed price index; 
∆ Sales represents an index of the growth rate of sales in nominal prices, i.e Sales
t+1/S
t; 
∆ K_U represents a capacity utilization index; 
∆ F_A  represents an index for fixed assets in the balance sheet. 
We acknowledge that there are several, quite restrictive, assumptions underlying this indicator. 
For example, we have assumed that the change in capacity utilization should be associated with a 
proportional increase in output, that the change in fixed assets is reflected by a change in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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capacity, and we fail to control for any revaluation of fixed assets due to inflation, depreciation 
and so on  Nonetheless, the indicator provides an interesting comparison between our three 
groups, as illustrated in table 6.11. 
  
Table 6.11 Capacity Utilisation, Fixed Assets and Prices 
 1999/1998  1999/1997 
    
Bad  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev 
∆ K_U  240 1.19 0.40 237 1.34 1.06 
∆ F_A  240 0.98 0.28 234 0.92 0.66 
∆ Sales  243 1.65 0.80 239 1.51 1.39 
∆ Sales (const. prices)  236 1.16 0.50 228 1.22 1.71 
PIndex  235 1.56 0.79 226 1.62 1.10 
        
Good  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev 
∆ K_U  90 1.15  0.29 90 1.29  0.46 
∆ F_A  88 0.99  0.33 81 0.93  0.40 
∆ Sales  91 1.77  0.49 84 2.34  1.03 
∆ Sales (const. prices)  87 1.15  0.50 80 1.22  0.74 
PIndex  87 1.75  0.88 80 2.24  1.18 
        
Very good  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev  No. Obs.  Mean  St. dev 
∆ K_U  66 1.15  0.25 65 1.31  0.78 
∆ F_A  66 1.16  0.30 65 1.35  0.72 
∆ Sales  66 1.88  0.54 66 2.64  1.66 
∆ Sales(const. prices)  66 1.33  0.46 64 1.67  1.07 
PIndex  66 1.53  0.59 64 1.87  1.28 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The resulting numbers are not at all as expected. The good group shows higher price growth than 
the bad and very good groups for both 99/98 and for 99/97 periods; surprisingly, the very good 
and the bad groups report very similar levels of price growth. It is also interesting to note how 
differently our groups reacted to the crises. All groups report increased output in constant prices, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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however, the bad and good groups increased output by about 20 percent between 1997 and 1999, 
while the very good group increased output by almost 70 percent in the same period. Moreover, 
the indicators illustrate that while output growth in the very good group was based on expanding 
capacities — as capacity utilization increased less than output — firms in the good and bad 
group on average increased output less than capacity utilisation.  
 
The second proxy to measure shadow activity was calculated by comparing two answers for the 
same question: “What is an average wage in your enterprise?” In the interview with the top-
manager of the firm was asked to report the average monthly wage of employees at the 
enterprise. On the other hand we can calculate the average wage from other data by using the 
balance sheet information collected separately in the accounting department. The results of these 
question need not coincide if we assume that the enterprise is paying shadow wages out of 
‘black-cash’ revenues to save on taxes and social charges. If this is the case, there is a good 
chance that when asked the general manager would name the real figure as he probably does 
know how much he had to pay to his workers but may not know the ratio between “white” and 
“black” cash payments. In this case the difference between the manager’s answer and that based 
on the wages and salaries reported in the balance sheet data may serve as a measure of the 
shadow activity. The results of this calculation are shown in the table 6.12 below. 
 
Table 6.12 Deviation in Average Wage by Groups 
 1998  1999 
  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Bad 1.12  0.20  1.13  0.25 
Good 1.11  0.19  1.14  0.23 
Very good  1.08  0.18  1.04  0.16 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
It is encouraging that the very good group has much smaller differential between the manager’s 
answer and accountants’ figures in 1999, but more careful analysis is needed before any 
interpretation could be provided. Preliminary analysis showed that this deviation — if it is 
meaningful at all — does not correlate with performance variables. It is, however, highly William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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significantly correlated with the size of enterprise and is much higher in the Food industry than 
any other. 
 
7. Conclusions  and  Meta-Analysis 
 
In this paper, we have used the findings from the first large scale random sample conducted in 
Russian since the mid-1990s on enterprise restructuring to focus on the constraints on micro-
economic performance in the period after the 1998 financial crisis.  Several key findings emerge 
from this study.  Restructuring in Russian firms remains modest, even nearly a decade after the 
start of economic reforms.  Productivity has continued to fall and remains low, while investment 
levels are low and restructuring efforts modest.  It is, however, encouraging that the bulk of firms 
are engaged in deep rather than purely defensive restructuring.  Under the fairly modest criteria 
for a “good” firm laid out in section 6 (positive value added and profits and fairly stable output 
less that 50% of Russian firms in our sample are “good”, and only 16% “very good” in the sense 
they had also undertaken positive net investment.  The good and very good firms were 
characterised by higher capacity utilisation, a younger vintage of capital, less labour hoarding 
and higher wages and exports. 
 
When we attempt to understand the reasons underlying the wide variation in performance across 
firms, our results do not confirm standard theoretical hypotheses.  As has been found in 
numerous other studies of the former Soviet Union (see e.g. Estrin and Wright (1999) or 
Djankov and Murrell (2000)) ownership and performance are not well correlated in Russia.  In 
particular, there is no strong evidence that outsider ownership leads to better performance or 
higher levels of restructuring activity than insider ownership.  Conventional explanations point to 
capital market imperfections, and governance deficiencies (see Nellis (2000)).  Our findings are 
consistent with this in indicating only limited correlation between ownership and perceived 
control over enterprise decision-making.  While insiders are perceived as having control over 
most insider owned firms, insiders are also perceived to control nearly half of outsider owned 
firms, and more than a third of state owned firms.  This is perhaps a consequence of the high 
levels of dispersion of outsider ownership in Russia (see Djankov and Murrell (2000)). 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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The findings on competition are slightly more encouraging, in that they confirm a positive 
association between restructuring activity and the competitiveness of the market environment in 
which firms operate.  Domestic competition spurs more deep restructuring, and to some extent 
more defensive restructuring as well.  Foreign competition is still a relatively insignificant factor 
in improving enterprise performance in Russia, though it plays more of a role in stimulating 
investment.  However, the results do not yet carry over from qualitative indicators to augmented 
production functions. 
 
On the financial side, our study indicates that company size is a relevant factor in obtaining short 
but not long term credit, while equity financing is equally rare for all firm types in Russia.  
Overall, most Russian firms (almost 70%) have quite serious financial constraints because of a 
combination of limited access to credit, poorly developed capital markets and weak cash flow.   
Financial constraints appear to be highly correlated with corporate performance and behaviour.  
However the causality is complex, and given the limited possibility of recourse to external 
financing from any source runs in large part from restructuring to financial performance rather 
than the other way round.  Investment is also inversely related to the degree of financial 
constraint. 
 
The relationship between the various exogenous variables specifying the factor and product 
market environment and the internal incentive structures of firms on the one hand, and enterprise 
performance on the other, are likely to be complex. For example, whether state owned forms 
perform worse than private ones will depend on both the measure of performance used 
(profitability as against total factor productivity for example) and the market structure ( state 
owned firms operating in highly competitive markets may appear to perform relatively better 
than privately owned firms because bankruptcy constraints bind for the latter but not the former 
category).  Similarly, financial constraints may be more binding for private than state owned 
firms, especially those operating in competitive markets.  
 
To address these issues fully would require another paper. However, here we can usefully bring 
together the material presented previously by making a first attempt to explore the potential 
interactions between the independent variables. Rather than use any formal framework, our 
approach is to estimate equations cross-sectionally for 1999, using the five main measures of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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company performance employed in this paper; mark-up, return on equity (ROE) return on fixed 
assets, sales per worker and investment (as a share of fixed assets). We employ as explanatory 
variables for performance the three main categories of determinant at the heart of this paper – 
ownership, competition and financial constraints – as well as controls for industry, region and 
size. The ownership dummy variables are outsider and state (majority) owned firms, and firms 
with  no majority owner, with insider owned firms omitted. The competition dummy variables 
are medium domestic competition and domestic monopoly (with low competition omitted) and 
high import competition (low import competition excluded). The financial dummy variables 
represent partial and serious financial constraints (with the group of firms facing low financial 
constraints excluded). This yields a total of ten possible interactions, and the results for the five 
performance measures are reported in Table 7.1. 
 
The equations confirm the view that the factors influencing company performance need to be 
considered together. We observe some clear significant size effects on performance, notably with 
respect to mark up, ROE and productivity. The equations refute the view that small firms 
perform better in the Russian context. The broad results from the previous sections of this paper 
also come through clearly in this more sophisticated framework. Thus taken together we find 
domestic monopoly power, financial constraints and to a limited extent state ownership lead to 
inferior company performance across a wide range of measures. However, we can also add some 
interesting conclusions from the interactions. Most strikingly, there are clear interactions 
between state ownership and market structure. State ownership leads to improved performance 
across a number of measures when there is moderate domestic competition or import 
competition. It reduces it when there is domestic monopoly power. Hence we can confirm 
market structure effects are more pronounced when we simultaneously control for ownership. 
Financial constraints also depend on the ownership structure to some extent. Thus, financial 
constraints reduce performance across a variety of measures relative to what would pertain in 
insider owned firms. Clearly, more work is needed on these interactive effects, but Table 7.1 
indicates strong complementarities between the various factors influencing improved company 
performance, namely between ownership structure, financial constraints and monopoly power. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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Table 7.1 Performance on Size, Ownership and Financing Constraints with Interactions 
 Mark-up  Return  on 
Equity 
Return on 
Fixed Assets 
Sales Per 
Worker 
Investment / 
Fixed assets 
Medium Firms  0.0506** 
(0.0219) 
0.0595* 
(0.0344) 
0.0577 
(0.0704) 
8.8289 
(14.8023) 
0.0104 
(0.0174) 
Large Firms  0.0694*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0590* 
(0.0310) 
0.0568 
(0.0712) 
40.5450** 
(15.8802) 
0.01622 
(0.0166) 
Outside Owned  0.0023 
(0.0397) 
-0.0375 
(0.0591) 
0.1030 
(0.1679) 
-1.1472 
(29.5799) 
0.0258 
(0.0425) 
State Owned  0.0113 
(0.0483) 
0.0394 
(0.0807) 
0.6433 
(0.5237) 
48.1440 
(83.2535) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0343) 
Med.Dom. Comp.  0.0166 
(0.0281) 
0.0107 
(0.0351) 
-0.0230 
(0.0698) 
-8.7056 
(16.2156) 
0.0311 
(0.0219) 
Dom.Monop. -0.0099 
(0.0215) 
-0.0096 
(0.0967) 
-0.1551* 
(0.0865) 
-38.0353*** 
(14.5836) 
-0.0449** 
(0.0188) 
Imp.Comp. 0.0042 
(0.0235) 
0.0566* 
(0.0332) 
0.0686 
(0.6778) 
15.1693 
(17.0536) 
0.0318* 
(0.0186) 
Part. Fin. Const.  -0.0080 
(0.0215) 
-0.0694 
(0.0489) 
-0.0966 
(0.0875) 
6.4662 
(18.8450) 
-0.0357 
(0.0249) 
Fin.Const. -0.0632** 
(0.0282) 
-0.1384*** 
(0.0453) 
-0.2612*** 
(0.0838) 
-46.7091** 
(18.8050) 
-0.0736*** 
(0.0239) 
Outside ownership interacted with: 
Med.Dom. Comp.  0.0002 
(0.0476) 
0.0058 
(0.0630) 
0.1591 
(0.1520) 
14.4245 
(25.5738) 
-0.0477 
(0.0335) 
Dom.Monop. 0.0657 
(0.0444) 
0.0116 
(0.1095) 
0.3913 
(0.2665) 
25.3134 
(26.7948) 
0.1204* 
(0.0662) 
Imp.Comp. -0.0005  -0.0712  -0.0267  -28.3582  -0.0160 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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 (0.0430)  (0.0546)  (0.1377)  (25.0633)  (0.0311) 
Part. Fin. Const.  -0.0721* 
(0.0367) 
-0.1173* 
(0.0610) 
-0.4763*** 
(0.1779) 
-53.7726* 
(31.3683) 
-0.0432 
(0.0470) 
Fin.Const. -0.0447 
(0.0501) 
0.0090 
(0.0685) 
-0.1391 
(0.1948) 
-5.1743 
(28.4980) 
-0.0166 
(0.0454) 
State ownership interacted with: 
Med.Dom. Comp.  0.1577** 
(0.0680) 
0.6315*** 
(0.2362) 
1.1969*** 
(0.4128) 
93.4328* 
(54.7674) 
0.0643 
(0.0592) 
Dom.Monop. -0.4458*** 
(0.1059) 
-0.1504 
(0.1555) 
-0.3326 
(0.2859) 
-2.9652 
(75.7156) 
0.0299 
(0.0417) 
Imp.Comp. -0.0467 
(0.0763) 
0.0777 
(0.1295) 
0.7731*** 
(0.2816) 
238.2931*** 
(74.4625) 
0.0234 
(0.0471) 
Part. Fin. Const.  0.0350 
(0.0821) 
-0.0931 
(0.1326) 
-0.8289 
(0.5808) 
-105.6797 
(104.2506) 
0.0593 
(0.0488) 
Fin.Const. -0.0310 
(0.1235) 
-0.6206** 
(0.2929) 
-2.2900*** 
(0.8175) 
-397.5274*** 
(131.6609) 
-0.0185 
(0.0932) 
No majority 
ownership  
-0.0036 
(0.0340) 
-0.0335 
(0.0463) 
-0.1089 
(0.8581) 
-19.0423 
(20.6286) 
-0.0060 
(0.0310) 
Constant 0.0839** 
(0.0362) 
0.2867*** 
(0.0777) 
0.6236*** 
(0.1544) 
387.0141 
(37.0041) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0403) 
Regional Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. obs  306  291  300  310  293 
R-squared 0.2209  0.2118  0.2361  0.4891  0.2108 
F 43.94***  15.95***  28.99***  148.64***  4.6*** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively 
Source: Authors’ calculations William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
Overall our research therefore suggests three major policy conclusions. Firstly, this study — in 
accordance with other studies — demonstrates that Russian enterprises tend to concentrate their 
activity on the local and regional markets. Though the problem of administrative barriers which 
limit the ability of enterprises to enter other regional markets is not as acute as might have been 
expected, many enterprises — in particular those in the food industry — still complain about 
such barriers. In this regard, we suggest that the state should consider additional measures 
limiting regional administrative barriers. 
 
Secondly, our results show that further state policy facilitating the development of competition in 
the Russian industrial markets is a necessity. It appear to be potentially important to lower non-
economic barriers to import and barriers to entry for foreign firms, in view of strong tendencies 
of   integration and cross-ownership in Russian industry. 
 
Finally, we have uncovered strong evidence that self-financing of investments is not a feasible 
choice for the majority of Russian enterprises due to relatively small profit margins; moreover 
the inefficiency of banking sector precludes access to alternative appropriate external funding. 
While equity financing could become an alternative in the future, its development will require 
more transparent and efficient corporate governance. Currently the average board composition of 
our sampled enterprises does not appropriately reflect the ownership structure, and does not 
correspond to standards from other countries: employees, especially management and sometimes 
regional authorities are over-represented while other groups of stock and stake holders are 
underrepresented. Hence we suggest that the Government of Russia should enact policy to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 452 
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establish modern corporate governance legislation and practice, if it wishes to contribute to the 
development of a robust private sector in the Russian Federation.  
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